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Abstract
Research in the detection of cyber-attacks has sky-rocketed in the recent past. However,
there remains a striking gap between usage of the proposed algorithms in academic research
versus industrial applications. Leading researchers have argued that efforts toward the
understanding of proposed detectors are lacking. By digging deeper into their inner workings
and critically evaluating their underlying assumptions, better detectors may be built. The
aim of this thesis is therefore to provide an underlying theory for understanding a single
class of detection algorithms, in particular, anomaly-based network intrusion detection
algorithms that utilise high-resolution time series data.
A framework is proposed to deconstruct the algorithms into their constituent compo-
nents (windows, representations, and deviations). The framework is applied to a class of
algorithms, allowing to construct a “space” of algorithms spanned by five variables: window-
ing procedure, information availability, single- or multi-aggregated representation, marginal
distribution model, and deviation. The detection of a simple class of Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks is modelled as a detection theoretic problem. It is shown that the effect of incomplete
information is greatest when detecting low-intensity attacks (less than 5%), however, the
effect slowly decays as the attack intensity increases. Next, the representation and deviation
components are jointly analysed via a proposed experimental procedure using network
traffic from two publicly available datasets: the Measurement and Analysis on the WIDE
Internet (MAWI) archive, and the Booters dataset. The experimental analysis shows that
varying the representation (single- versus multi-aggregated) has little effect on detection
accuracy, and that the likelihood deviation is superior to the L2 distance deviation, although
the difference is negligible for large-intensity attacks (approximately 80%).
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In June 2017, chaos was spread globally by the so-called NotPetya cyber-attack. The attack
was disguised as ransomware, a tool used by cyber-criminals to hold a victim’s information
hostage. However, it was later discovered to be a highly sophisticated weapon designed with
one goal in mind – the mass destruction of information assets. The unfortunate reality is
that NotPetya is only one of many cyber-attacks occurring on a daily basis. The importance
of cyber-security cannot be understated. To that end, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) in the United States put forward the Cyber-Security Framework [3].
The framework classifies cyber-security activities along five different categories: identify,
protect, detect, respond, and recover. In this thesis, efforts are geared towards addressing
the third function, the detection of cyber-attacks.
Statement of the Problem
Research in the detection of cyber-attacks has sky-rocketed in the recent past, with numer-
ous proposed algorithms stemming from fields as diverse as machine learning, statistics, and
signal processing [4]. However, Sommer and Paxson note that ‘despite extensive academic
research one finds a striking gap in terms of actual deployments of such systems’ [5, p. 305].
In particular, they identified an unfortunate lack of deep insight into how the techniques
underlying proposed detectors work; instead they are often treated as black boxes. Along
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a similar argument, Gates and Taylor caution that ‘little work has gone into determining
if the underlying assumptions hold’ [6, p. 21]. They identified that proposed algorithms
are rarely accompanied by explicit underlying assumptions. Thus, they argue that by criti-
cally evaluating the assumptions underlying detectors, future work will be based on more
complete knowledge, and perhaps better detectors will be built. In summary, the lack of
research in understanding detection algorithms has led to a striking gap between academic
research and real-world application, which can be remedied by digging deeper into the
inner workings of the algorithms and critically evaluating their underlying assumptions.
Aim and Scope
The aim of this thesis is to provide an underlying theory for understanding a single class of
cyber-attack detection algorithms. Connecting a class of seemingly disparate algorithms to
a single consistent theoretical framework would allow to gain a deeper insight into how the
algorithms really work. By exploring their strengths and limitations, we will be able to build
better detectors. In addition, by identifying a connection between methods in cyber-security
and existing theories in other domains, new research avenues will be highlighted. Finally,
this thesis will strive to be completely open and reproducible. The developed computer
code is made publicly available in its entirety in the appendices and the described numerical
experiments are run on publicly available datasets. The author’s intention is for this thesis
to serve as part of a foundation for new researchers to more easily enter the domain and
provide their own original research.
The focus of this study is on the network level (operating on collections of intercon-
nected hosts) rather than the host level (operating on single entities). Two complementary
approaches to detection exist: anomaly-based detection, which operates by building profiles
of normal behaviour and detecting deviations from those profiles as potential attacks; and
misuse-based detection, which constructs profiles of the threat itself and matches observed
data with those profiles. The anomaly-based approach is considered here. Furthermore, due
to increasing throughputs and end-to-end encryption, techniques using only packet-header
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data (and not payload data) are considered here, also known as flow-based detection. Finally,
only methods based on statistical and signal processing domains are studied here.
Overview and Contributions
This thesis is split into two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) serves as the foundation,
upon which the contributions in the second part (Chapters 4 to 6) are built.
To begin with, Chapter 2 details the relevant background in three separate areas: intru-
sion detection, time series analysis, and detection theory. The discussion is narrowed down
in Chapter 3, where related literature is reviewed. The concepts detailed in this part are core
to the contributions made in the chapters that follow.
The first contribution (Chapter 4) provides a framework for deconstructing detection al-
gorithms into three components: windows, representations, and deviations. The framework
is applied to two state-of-the-art detection algorithms ([7] and [8]), allowing to highlight five
key differences between them: windowing procedure, information availability, representa-
tion, marginal distribution model, and deviation. Each difference is regarded as a separate
variable, such that their collection comprises a “space” of previously unexplored detection
algorithms. The exploration of this “space” is the focus of the remaining two contributions.
The second contribution (Chapter 5) models a simple detection problem – the detection
of a constant-rate Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack – within the framework of detection theory.
Two detectors are constructed with varying levels of information availability. Their compari-
son, in terms of the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC) allows to
investigate the effect of information availability on detection accuracy.
The third and final contribution (Chapter 6) jointly investigates the effect of variables
representation and deviation on detection accuracy. By varying the representation and
deviation, four detectors are constructed. An experimental procedure is proposed where
each detector is evaluated on one of 128 (= 9×14) different real network traffic datasets,
obtained by superposing each of 9 attacks of varying intensity on 14 non-attack datasets.




This chapter introduces basic concepts in intrusion detection, time series analysis, and
detection theory. These three areas serve as the foundation for the chapters that follow.
2.1 Intrusion Detection
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) gathers data about its environment and attempts to
extract information from that data in order to identify possibly malicious activities. Since,
typically, most data traversing the network are benign, the process has been likened to
‘finding a needle in a haystack.’
Based on a user’s authorization level and the activity they are trying to perform, it is
straightforward to identify unauthorized activity. Intrusion detection, on the other hand,
attempts to detect seemingly authorized activity performed by an intruder. For example,
an intruder might masquerade as a user with a higher authorization level to gain access to
confidential information. While the action would still appear to be authorized, an IDS is
expected to detect that it is in fact intrusive.
IDSs were deemed necessary when experts realized that security flaws in a static defence
are unavoidable. In an ideal world, one could design an entity that is perfectly secured.
In reality, however, as the complexity of designed entities is continuously growing, it is














Fig. 2.1. A diagram of a general IDS model, adapted from [9]. Objects (physical or digital) are
represented in red, and processes are represented in blue.
intruder cracks the password, phishes for private information, finds a vulnerable back door,
or masquerades as someone else and enters through the front door. When an intruder has
breached static defence measures, an IDS attempts to dynamically detect their unwelcome
presence before significant damage is dealt to the entity.
A general, high-level IDS model was originally proposed by Denning [10], thereafter
extended by Axelsson [9], and further adapted here. A diagrammatic description of the
model is presented in Fig. 2.1. Note that certain details have been abstracted out of the
diagram, e.g., software and hardware required for data collection and storage. Furthermore,
not every possible interaction between processes has been drawn in the figure. The purpose
of the diagram is to provide a high-level description of the main processes involved in an
IDS, namely:
1. Monitored Entity: Typically a host (e.g., computer, tablet, or mobile phone) or a
network of connected hosts that is to be monitored and secured.
2. Data Collection: Relevant data are collected from the monitored entity. In the case of
monitored hosts, data might include user login attempts, file manipulations, input
and output logs, and CPU usage. In the case of monitored networks, network packets
are considered the basic units of data from which different levels of aggregated data
can be derived, e.g., NetFlow data.
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3. Data Storage: A large amount of data can be collected and needs to be stored.
4. Configuration Settings: All parameters required by the IDS must be set and stored.
Parameters may include threshold values, window lengths, profile construction fre-
quency, update frequency, and detection frequency. Parameters may be adjusted
adaptively by the IDS or manually by a security officer.
5. Analysis: Based on the configuration settings, profiles are constructed from the col-
lected data. Anomaly- and misuse-based IDSs differ in what they construct profiles
of. The former constructs profiles of normal (or expected) behaviour, and the latter
constructs profiles of malicious behaviour.
6. Profiles: Profiles range from simple static signatures (e.g., Snort [11] rule sets) to more
complex statistical and signal processing models (e.g., those described in Chapters 3
and 4).
7. Detection: Based on the configuration settings, newly observed data are compared
against constructed profiles. If some pre-defined decision rule is met, an alarm is
raised. In anomaly-based detection, an alarm is raised if observed data sufficiently
deviate from pre-constructed profiles of normal behaviour. In misuse-based detection,
an alarm is raised if observed data are sufficiently similar to pre-constructed profiles
of malicious behaviour.
8. Alarm: A report is generated containing all information relevant to a detected incident,
allowing the security officer(s) to respond accordingly. Automated responses can also
be performed directly on the monitored entity, e.g., drop malicious packets, close
malicious connections, close malicious applications, and so on.
9. Security Officer: Security officers may manually fine-tune configurations and profiles
and are expected to respond to alarms. IDS performance is essentially measured in
terms of its usability by security officers. If the IDS overwhelms security officers with
excessive false alarms, the system is not usable. If attacks pass by the IDS unnoticed,












Fig. 2.2. A numerical experiment demonstrating the possible outcomes of an IDS for a hypothetical
scenario. (a) A set of two-dimensional data points that are either malicious or benign. (b) An
arbitrarily chosen circular boundary representing how an IDS might decide which data points cause
an alarm or not. (c) The outcomes of the IDS on the dataset.
In the last point of the above description, the term false alarms was used. This term
will now be described briefly. It is often useful to think of IDSs as binary classifiers. Given
a set of data points, an IDS must decide whether each data point is malicious or benign.
The outcome of each decision can be correct or incorrect, depending on whether the data
point is actually malicious or benign. There are four possible outcomes to any such decision,
called true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), and false negative (FN).
These outcomes are explained visually in Fig. 2.2 with the aid of a hypothetical scenario. A
primary challenge in designing IDSs is to find an optimum between minimizing the false
positive rate while maximizing the true positive rate.
Anomaly- and misuse-based detection were briefly introduced in the above discussion.
The two complementary approaches will now be compared against each other. Misuse-
based detection constructs well-defined profiles of malicious behaviour. If the profiles are
matched by observed data, it is highly likely that an intrusion has occurred. However, the
misuse-based approach is completely incapable of detecting novel and unknown attacks,
since a profile of a novel and unknown attack cannot exist before the attack has been
observed. On the other hand, anomaly-based detection operates without a model of the
attack scenario, by constructing profiles of normal (or expected) behaviour. Deviations in
observed data from the profiles are identified as potential attacks. Anomaly-based IDSs
typically have high false alarm rates, since anomalous behaviour is often not malicious, e.g.,
new software is released, new habits are formed, and so on. However, the anomaly-based
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approach allows the detection of novel and unknown attacks, and of attacks that are difficult
to characterize by explicit signatures.
Anomaly- and misuse-based detection are complementary approaches. In a compre-
hensive defence, both approaches must be balanced.
2.2 Time Series Analysis
This section provides a brief discussion of foundational concepts in the analysis of time
series that are relevant to this thesis. The discussion does not aim to be comprehensive. The
ideas expressed closely follow the textbook by Box, Jenkins, and Reinsel [12] to which the
reader is directed for further details.
The analysis of time series ought to begin by defining what a time series is. A time series
is considered to be a set of observations x(τ1), x(τ2), · · · , x(τt ), · · · , x(τN ) made at discrete
points in time τ1,τ2, · · · ,τt , · · · ,τN . It is assumed here that the observation times {τt } are
recorded at fixed intervals of length h starting at some initial time τ0; i.e., the observation
times can be rewritten as τ0+h,τ0+2h, · · · ,τ0+ th, · · · ,τ0+N h. Given the initial time τ0 and
the unit of time h, it is notationally convenient to write the time series as x1, x2, · · · , xt , · · · , xN .
Here, the index t conveys that xt was observed t intervals of length h after the initial time τ0.
Time series may be recorded in one of two ways. Either, by sampling a continuous-
time variable at discrete points in time (e.g., temperature recorded every minute), or by
accumulating a variable over time (e.g., the total amount of rainfall recorded each day).
Time series may also be categorised as being either deterministic or statistical. A time series
is said to be deterministic if its future value is determined by some mathematical function.
On the other hand, a time series is said to be statistical if its future value is described only in
terms of a probability distribution. In order to visualize the difference between deterministic
and statistical time series, simple examples of both are plotted in Fig. 2.3. Time series dealt
with in practice typically consist of both deterministic and statistical components.
In order to model a statistical time series, it is considered a realization of a stochastic
process – a statistical phenomenon that evolves in time according to probabilistic laws. It
8
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Fig. 2.3. Simple examples of a deterministic time series and a statistical time series. (a) A deterministic
time series, xt = sin(t), completely specified by a sinusoidal function of time. (b) A statistical time
series, yt = sin(t)+ϵt , specified by a sinusoidal function depending on time in addition to a noise
term ϵt which can only be described in terms of a probability law.
may be imagined that many other time series could have been generated as realizations
of the same underlying stochastic process, although only one particular time series was
generated and observed (as visualized in Fig. 2.4). Formally, the observation xt at a given
time t , may be regarded as a realization of a random variable X t with probability density
function pt (xt ). Similarly, the observations at any two times t1 and t2 may be regarded as
realizations of two random variables X t1 and X t2 with joint probability density function
pt1,t2 (xt1 , xt2 ). More generally, the observations at N successive points in time t = 1,2, · · · , N
may be regarded as a realization of N random variables X1, X2, · · · , XN with joint probability
density function p1,2,··· ,N (x1, x2, · · · , xN ). Marginal and bivariate distributions estimated from
an ensemble of realizations of a stationary Gaussian stochastic process are plotted in Fig. 2.5
to aid understanding of the above concepts.
Thus, in modelling a time series of N observations, it may be regarded as a single
realization of N jointly-distributed random variables. For small N it is possible to specify
the N -dimensional joint probability density function thus providing a complete model of a
given time series. However, specifying a high-dimensional probability distribution function
becomes increasingly impractical as N grows. In contrast, it is desired to model a time series
using a parsimonious model; i.e., using as few parameters as possible. It often suffices in
practice to model only the second-order properties of a time series – the first- and second-
9
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Fig. 2.4. A collection of time series, each a possible realization of the same underlying stochastic
process. The iterative generating process in this case is a random walk, X t = X t−1 +ϵt for t > 0 and
X0 = 0, where ϵt is Gaussian-distributed with zero mean and unit variance. A single realization (or
time series) is highlighted in blue.
order moments of its joint probability distribution. This includes the mean µt = E [X t ] and
the covariance γs,t = E [(Xs −µs)(X t −µt )] where s, t = 1,2, · · · , N . 1
Modelling only the second-order properties of a time series is not necessarily a complete
specification of its underlying stochastic process, except in one special case – if the process is
Gaussian. A stochastic process is said to be Gaussian if and only if all of its finite-dimensional
joint distributions are multi-variate Gaussian; i.e., the joint distributions of (X t1 , X t2 , · · · , X tn )
for all n ∈ {1,2, · · · , N } and t1, t2, · · · , tn ∈ {1,2, · · · , N } are multi-variate Gaussian. Gaussian
processes are completely specified by their mean µt and covariance γs,t . However, if a
process is non-Gaussian, the second-order properties are not sufficient to completely spec-
ify its probability law; information is lost. This information may be partially recovered by
specifying the first- and/or second-dimensional joint distributions of the process, usually
called the marginal distributions and the bivariate distributions, respectively. The marginal
distributions, pt (xt ), are not necessarily equal for all t . Similarly, the bivariate distributions,
pt1,t2 (xt1 , xt2 ), are not necessarily equal for all t1 and t2. However, if a stochastic process is
strictly stationary; i.e., all of its finite-dimensional distributions are invariant under trans-
lation, then of course the marginal and bivariate distributions are also invariant under
translation. If only the moments up to order m are invariant under translation, then the
process is said to be weakly stationary of order m. 2
1E [X ] denotes the application of the expectation operator to a random variable X .
2Definitions related to stationarity often differ between texts, the notation of [12] has been adopted here.
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Fig. 2.5. Marginal and bivariate distributions of a stationary Gaussian stochastic process. (a) Re-
alizations of a stationary Gaussian stochastic process X t , with a single realization highlighted in
blue. (b) Estimated marginal distribution, p(xt ), of the process. (c) Estimated bivariate distribution,
pt ,t−τ(xt , xt−τ), of the process. Darker colours indicate higher probability densities. A separate
bivariate distribution exists for each lag value τ; only the distribution for τ= 1 has been plotted.
Stationarity is an important requirement for performing almost any statistical inference
about a set of data. For example, suppose a given time series (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) is generated
by a non-stationary stochastic process. This is a single sample of an N -dimensional joint
distribution. Not much can be inferred about a generating probability distribution from
only a single sample! However, stationarity implies that the random variables X1, X2, · · · , XN
all share the same probability distribution. Thus, a single realization of a stationary time
series of length N provides N samples of the marginal distribution of that time series; much
can be inferred about the generating distribution in this case.
The concepts expressed in this section are basic requirements for working with statis-
tical time series. In particular, the notion of stationarity is central to the contributions in
Chapter 4.
2.3 Detection Theory
Relevant background material in classical detection theory will be developed in this section.
The discussion closely follows the textbook by Van Trees, Bell, and Tian [13]. Detection
theory provides a useful framework for dealing with certain problems in intrusion detection
(e.g., see [14] and Chapter 5 of this thesis).
The detection problem can be modelled as consisting of four basic components: a
source, a probability transition mechanism, an observation space, and a decision rule. An
11
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experiment begins with the source, a device that generates an output out of M choices. The
present discussion will be confined to the binary problem, M = 2. The choices are referred
to as hypotheses, and denoted by H0 and H1. For example, in radar target detection, H0
represents the absence of a target, and H1 represents the presence of a target. In network in-
trusion detection, H0 represents the absence of an intruder, and H1 represents the presence
of an intruder. The challenge here is that it is not known which hypothesis is true.
The probability transition mechanism is a device that knows which hypothesis is true.
Depending on which hypothesis is true, the device generates a signal, represented by an
N -dimensional vector x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ). The signal x inhabits the observation space, and
is generated according to some probability law. The respective probability law under each
hypothesis is denoted by pX|H0 (x|H0) and pX|H1 (x|H1). In the radar target detection example,
the probability transition mechanism may corrupt the source signal with additive Gaussian
noise. In the network intrusion detection example, the probability transition mechanism
embeds the attack signal in benign background network traffic.
The problem is then to define a decision rule, which observes x in the observation space,
and must decide which hypothesis was true. This process corresponds to assigning each
point in the observation space to either H0 or H1. There are four possible outcomes to a
given decision attempt:
1. H0 true; choose H0.
2. H0 true; choose H1.
3. H1 true; choose H1.
4. H1 true; choose H0.
Outcomes 1 and 3 correspond to correct decisions, and outcomes 2 and 4 correspond to
errors. A decision criterion is required to attach relative importance to each of the four
possible outcomes. Two criteria of interest are the Bayes Criterion and the Neyman-Pearson
Criterion. It turns out that the processing on x required to make the best decision are the
same for both of these criteria [13].
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The Bayes Criterion is based on two assumptions. First, that either H0 is true with
probability P0 = Pr{H0 true}, or H1 is true with probability P1 = Pr{H1 true}. The probabilities
P0 and P1 are referred to as the prior probabilities. Second, that each of the four possible
outcomes incurs a cost, denoted by C00, C01, C11, and C10, respectively. Here, the first
subscript denotes the hypothesis that is chosen, and the second subscript denotes the
hypothesis that was true. Denote the probability that a particular course of action is taken
by
Pr{choose Hk ∩Hl true} = Pr{choose Hk |Hl true}Pl , (2.1)
for k = 0,1 and l = 0,1. Then, the Bayes Criterion, also called the risk, is defined as the
expected value of the cost incurred; i.e., the sum of the costs weighted by their probability of
occurrence:
R =C00P0 Pr{choose H0|H0 true}
+C10P0 Pr{choose H1|H0 true}
+C11P1 Pr{choose H1|H1 true}
+C01P1 Pr{choose H0|H1 true}.
(2.2)
It can be shown that, provided C10 >C00 and C01 >C11, R is minimized by choosing H1 if
pX|H1 (x|H1)
pX|H0 (x|H0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ(x)
> P0(C10 −C00)
P1(C01 −C11)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
, (2.3)
and choosing H0 otherwise [13]. It is interesting to note that all processing of the data x has
been disentangled from the criterion-specific assumptions about the prior probabilities
and cost assignments, and is entirely handled by the likelihood ratio Λ(x). Regardless of
the dimensionality of x, the likelihood ratio, upon which decisions are based, is always
one-dimensional. The threshold η, brings the assumptions about the prior probabilities and
cost assignments into the decision rule.
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A special case of interest is when C10 =C01 = 1 and C00 =C11 = 0, and the risk becomes
the total probability of making an error
Pe = P0 Pr{choose H1|H0 true}
+P1 Pr{choose H0|H1 true}.
(2.4)






and H0 otherwise. Eq. (2.5) is known as the Minimum Probability of Error (MPE) detector.
An alternative form can be used, since P1 > 0 and pX|H0 (x|H0) > 0,






for k = 0,1, where pX(x) is a normalizing factor defined by
pX(x) = pX|H0 (x|H0)P0 +pX|H1 (x|H1)P1. (2.8)
The posterior probability Pr{Hk |x} is the probability that Hk was true, given an observed x.
An equivalent detector to (2.5) is then to choose H1 if
Pr{H1|x} > Pr{H0|x}, (2.9)
and H0 otherwise. Eq. (2.9) is known as the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) detector. Further-
more, if P0 = P1, the optimal detector is to choose H1 if
pX|H0 (x|H0) > pX|H1 (x|H1), (2.10)
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known as the Maximum Likelihood (ML) detector. Interestingly, all of the above-mentioned
detectors may be described as a Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT); i.e., comparing the likelihood
ratioΛ(x) with some threshold η.
In realistic scenarios it is often difficult to assign appropriate costs or prior probabilities.
Recall that the general goal in detection problems is to maximise the probability of detection
PD = Pr{choose H1|H1 true}, (2.11)
and to minimize the probability of false alarm
PFA = Pr{choose H0|H1 true}. (2.12)
However, these two conditions are generally conflicting. The Neyman-Pearson (NP) ap-
proach proposes to maximise PD for a given PFA = α. The NP detector; i.e., the optimal




where the threshold ξ is chosen such that PFA =α.
Just as the NP criterion is completely described in terms of PD and PFA, the Bayes risk
criterion in (2.2) may also be characterized completely by PD and PFA as follows. Since the
events {choose H0} and {choose H1} are complements of each other, it follows that
Pr{choose H0|H0 true} = 1−Pr{choose H1|H0 true}
= 1−PFA,
(2.14a)
Pr{choose H0|H1 true} = 1−Pr{choose H1|H1 true}
= 1−PD.
(2.14b)
Substituting (2.14a) and (2.14b) into (2.2) and simplifying, the risk can be written as
R = P0C00 +P1C01 +P0(C10 −C00)PFA −P1(C01 −C11)PD. (2.15)
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Therefore, regardless of the chosen evaluation criterion, the accuracy of a detector can be
completely specified by the probability of false alarm, PFA, and the probability of detection,
PD. The curve obtained by observing PFA versus PD, while varying the threshold η, is known
as the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, which provides a complete measure
of a detector’s accuracy.
Detection theory provides useful tools that are yet to be adopted into mainstream intru-
sion detection research [14]. To that end, the ideas introduced in this chapter are applied to
the intrusion detection domain in Chapter 5.
2.4 Summary
This chapter introduced fundamental ideas and notions required by the chapters to follow.
Basic concepts in intrusion detection, time series analysis, and detection theory were briefly
touched upon. In particular, the notion of stationarity is central to time series anomaly
detection in Chapter 4. Furthermore, detection theory provides a useful model for detecting




This chapter reviews the related literature. The discussion is focused on Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) operating on the network level rather than on individual hosts, and on the
anomaly-based approach rather than the misuse-based approach. This subset of anomaly-
based network IDSs coincides with research in the field of network traffic anomaly detection,
providing an alternative perspective also developed here. A wide variety of detection meth-
ods have been proposed in the literature, of which statistical and signal processing methods
are emphasised in this chapter.
3.1 Historical Development of Intrusion Detection
The first documented design and development of automated intrusion detection was by
Anderson [15] in the 1980s. Prior to this, intrusion detection was performed manually by
printing out audit trail data (e.g., logs of user logins and file access) and manually searching
for suspicious activity. Anderson proposed to summarise large volumes of audit trail records
by statistical measures, in particular the mean and standard deviation of chosen features of
the data, and to compare the measures against a set of absolute limits (a predefined number
of standard deviations away from the mean).
This novel approach gained impetus through the work of Denning. Of particular import
was Denning’s general IDS model proposed in 1987 [10]. The model decomposes IDSs into
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their interacting elements (similar to that discussed in Section 2.1). Denning also paved the
way forward by posing research questions that are still relevant today, quoting from [10]:
• Soundness of Approach: Does the approach actually detect intrusions? Is it
possible to distinguish anomalies related to intrusions from those related
to other factors?
• Completeness of Approach: Does the approach detect most, if not all, in-
trusions, or is a significant proportion of intrusions undetectable by this
method?
• Timeliness of Approach: Can we detect most intrusions before significant
damage is done?
• Choice of Metrics, Statistical Models, and Profiles: What metrics, mod-
els, and profiles provide the best discriminating power? Which are cost-
effective? What are the relationships between certain types of anomalies
and different methods of intrusions? [10, p. 231]
Although the modern landscape presents new challenges, the above questions and
limitations raised by Denning are still at the heart of anomaly-based IDSs today. Several
key reviews have acknowledged that treatments of the above issues are still lacking [4–
6, 16, 17]. In addition to these issues, two contemporary challenges have been recognized by
researchers in the field [4, 16–18]. First, the enormous and growing throughput of network
traffic places computational constraints on the development of IDSs. And, second, the
increasing use of end-to-end encryption in user applications renders obsolete classical
detection methods that rely on analyzing packet payload information.
Sperotto et al. [18] argued that detection based only on packet-header data, also called
flow data, provides a means to overcome the above two challenges: high throughputs are
managed since less data requires processing, and encryption is no longer inhibiting since the
encrypted payload data are not required for detection. Although certain intrusions simply
cannot be detected using only packet-header data, these flow-based intrusion detection
18
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Fig. 3.1. A plot of Maxion-and-Feathers’s method [19] applied to the Waikato ISPDSL2 dataset [20].
Where the original time series (black) exits the tolerance envelope (light blue) an anomaly is identified
(red).
methods have proven capable of detecting a variety of malicious network-wide activities,
including Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, port scans, worms, and botnets [18].
This subset of flow-based network IDSs marks the point of intersection with another
area of research: network traffic anomaly detection. Whereas flow-based IDSs began with
security in mind and adapted to the network domain, network traffic anomaly detection
began attempting to characterize networks and network traffic and later adapted to the
security domain. The latter perspective will be described next.
3.2 Network Traffic Anomaly Detection
The pioneering work of Maxion and Feather [19] was among the first and most compre-
hensive treatments of network traffic anomaly detection. The emphasis was not to identify
malicious activity, since cybercrime was not yet a serious concern, but rather to identify
network faults and outages. Maxion and Feather proposed a method that constructed time
series models of daily activity by smoothing time series data of previous days. Tolerance en-
velopes based on standard deviations allowed to categorize levels of normality. This method
and variations thereof are considered standard approaches to time series anomaly detection.
The approach was validated in a series of case studies where several distinct network faults
and attacks were successfully detected. In order to demonstrate the method in action, it has
been applied in Fig. 3.1 to the Waikato ISPDSL2 dataset [20]. The time series is the number
of packets received within five minute intervals for approximately one week. The centre of
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Fig. 3.2. A plot of Brutlag’s method [21] applied to the Waikato ISPDSL2 dataset [20]. Where the
original time series (black) exits the tolerance envelope (light blue) an anomaly is identified (red).
the tolerance envelope (light blue) is a smoothed version of the original time series (black).
The upper and lower limits of the tolerance envelopes are plus and minus three and a half
standard deviations of the residual (the residual being the smoothed time series subtracted
from the original). Where the original time series leaves the tolerance envelope, anomalies
have been identified (red). The method is an improvement over absolute limits (as in [15])
since it takes deterministic cycles into consideration.
Brutlag [21] extended methods based on simple exponential smoothing to employ Holt-
Winters forecasting models (also known as triple exponential smoothing). Holt-Winters
models take into account deterministic trends and cycles. The method operates by predict-
ing one sample point ahead and computing the residual (prediction error). An adaptive
envelope of acceptable residual values is constructed by applying a seasonal forecasting
model to the residual time series. This is the primary improvement to Maxion-and-Feather’s
method. The implementation of the model was made public and parameter selection was
guided in detail – two further reasons for the work’s acclaim. The method has been applied
in Fig. 3.2 to the Waikato ISPDSL2 dataset [20]. The difference from Maxion-and-Feather’s
approach, due to the adaptive tolerance envelope used here, is particularly noticeable where
the time series steadily rises and decays. Since there is typically low variability in the time
series at these parts, the tolerance envelope is narrower here than in Fig. 3.1. The adaptive
tolerance envelope allows to better detect anomalies that occur at these low variable parts
of the time series, as is demonstrated in the figure. Brutlag also attempted to reduce false
positives by only addressing so-called failures, where k anomalies occur within a window of
fixed length.
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Fig. 3.3. A plot of Lakhina’s method [24–26] applied to the Abilene dataset [27]. (a) 3 out of a collection
of 121 dependent time series. (b) The L2 norm across all 121 time series at given points in time (black)
and the PCA reconstruction error (light blue) with the 15 highest reconstruction errors labelled as
anomalies (red).
Barford et al. [22, 23] proposed an alternative method based on wavelet analysis. The
time series was decomposed via wavelet analysis into three frequency bands: low, medium,
and high. The low-frequency part captures regular trends in the traffic; i.e., daily and weekly
cycles. The medium-frequency part captures daily variations away from low-frequency
trends. Lastly, the high-frequency part captures noise and erratic bursts. Since anomalies
are typically transient, they tend not to affect the low-frequency part. Therefore, a deviation
score was defined in terms of the medium- and high- frequency parts. Barford et al. com-
pared their method with Brutlag’s method on a manually labelled data set, and found that
they produced similar results.
Lakhina et al. [24–26], in a sequence of three influential papers, extended network traffic
anomaly detection to a network-wide view. Whereas, previously, multiple time series each
corresponding to distinct network links were treated independently, this work constructed a
normal model from the inter-dependence between time series (corresponding to distinct
network links). This form of dependence has been considered the spatial equivalent to
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temporal dependence as in the previously described methods. A principal component
analysis (PCA) was performed on the collection of time series. The principal components
were ordered in terms of their proportion of total energy captured. Projecting the time
series onto the first few principle components reconstructs the regular deterministic trends
(daily and weekly cycles). Projecting the time series onto the next few principle components
reconstructs daily variations and spikes. Projecting the time series onto the last few principle
components reconstructs noise. The key finding was that out of hundreds of time series,
the subspace spanned by the first 5 to 10 principal components allowed to reconstruct each
time series with high accuracy. Furthermore, the reconstruction error was demonstrated as
a useful metric for detecting anomalies.
The method has been demonstrated in Fig. 3.3 on the Abliene dataset [27], a collection
of one hundred and twenty one (121) dependent time series were sampled at ten minute
intervals for a total of one week. First, the time series are reconstructed using the first seven
principal components, which yields a reconstruction error of 4% error. The anomalies with
the 15 highest reconstruction errors have been plotted, showing that the method detects
anomalies that would not be detected by, e.g., thresholding the L2 norm across all time
series at each point in time.
The method of [25] was further extended in [26] to consider packet-header features (IP
addresses and ports) in addition to simple byte counts. It was recognized that the dispersion
of feature distributions is useful for characterizing well-known anomalies. For example, port
scans send packets to the same destination IP from many different source IPs over different
ports. This dispersion of observed source IPs and ports together with the concentration of
many packets sent to the same destination IP can therefore be used to detect port scans.
Sample entropy was proposed as one possible measure of dispersion, though the authors
suggested that other measures could also have been used. Interestingly, it was found that the
entropy method and the prior volume method detected barely overlapping sets of anomalies;
the two methods complemented each other.
The methods described in this section have since been extended in many different
directions. This thesis focuses on one particular direction: detection with high-resolution
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time series data, sampled at millisecond intervals. All of the above methods operate on
time series sampled at intervals no less than five minutes long. Since decisions can only be
made as frequently as new samples are observed, anomalies (correspondingly attacks) can
only be detected at five minute intervals. In reality, it is desirable to operate at much finer
resolutions. The faster an attack is detected the less damage it can deal. Time series sampled
at millisecond intervals present new challenges that require approaches distinct from those
presented in this section. These challenges and approaches will be discussed next.
3.3 Detection With High-Resolution Time Series
It is useful to think of network traffic time series as being composed of two parts: determin-
istic and stochastic. The deterministic part closely follows the so-called diurnal cycle; i.e.,
high activity during the day peaking around noon, followed by low activity during the night.
On the other hand, the characteristics of the stochastic part depend on the length of the
sample interval.
The methods discussed in the previous section operate on time series sampled at inter-
vals of no less than five minutes long. It is desirable to operate with much shorter sample
intervals. However, as the sample interval is shortened to meet this requirement, the proper-
ties of the time series change. With five minute intervals, the deterministic component of
the time series is the main component required to model the time series. Models that de-
compose time series into smooth deterministic functions of time superposed with Gaussian
noise have been comprehensively treated in the literature, e.g., those described in the previ-
ous section [19, 21, 23–26]. With one millisecond intervals, the deterministic component is
approximately constant, and superposed with non-Gaussian noise. To model these time
series requires specifying a time-varying non-Gaussian distribution. Two key approaches to
this problem will be discussed next.
Scherrer et al. [7] proposed a model of the time series of packet counts consisting of two
parts. The marginal distribution of the time series was modelled by a gamma distribution,
and the autocovariance function was modelled by that of an Autoregressive Fractionally
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Integrated Moving Average (ARFIMA) process. The model was demonstrated to provide a
reasonable approximation over a wide range of sample interval lengths and for a variety
of different networks, including wide area networks, local area networks, and backbone
networks. Models were validated graphically by comparing an empirical histogram to the
theoretical probability density function, and numerically by comparing the chi-squared test
statistic of the gamma distribution to that of the exponential, log-normal, and chi-squared
distributions. The gamma distribution provided the best fit over the majority of sample
interval lengths. The gamma distribution also fit the data under the effects of a DoS attack,
though the parameters shifted. This observation served as the basis for detecting DoS attacks.
Attacks were detected by thresholding the mean quadratic distance between the parameters
of the model fitted to a reference window and a test window. The assumption is that the
occurrence of the attack in the test window would be detected as a shift in parameters of the
model. The method was evaluated on real recorded network traffic of a simulated DoS user
datagram protocol (UDP) flood attack with varying intensity, duration, packet size, and send
rate. Attacks were generated using the software iPerf [28] and Trinoo [29] on a low activity
network. The method was evaluated via a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis,
though the method was not compared to any others. This is perhaps due to this work being
among the first to focus on detection with high-resolution time series.
The above work was extended by Simmross-Wattenberg et al. [8]. First, an alpha-stable
distribution was proposed to replace the gamma distribution model. It was demonstrated
that the alpha-stable distribution better models the heavy tails present in network traffic
time series, thus leading to more accurate detection. Second, the generalized likelihood ratio
(GLRT) [13] was computed to measure the deviation between reference and test data rather
than the mean quadratic distance. Third, assuming periodicity (with a weekly period) in the
marginal distributions, the reference models were constructed from previous week data. For
example, to perform detection at 1pm on Monday today, make reference to 1pm on Monday
last week, the week before that, and so on. Fourth, a model of the attack was assumed by
simulating the attack and superposing the results on the reference data. Goodness-of-fit
of the alpha-stable and gamma distribution were compared via the corrected Kolmogorov-
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Smirnoff test statistic. The correction is required due to the bias introduced into the statistic
when the parameters of the probability density function are estimated from data (the true
parameters of the distribution are unknown). The method was evaluated via a ROC analysis
and demonstrated superior detection performance to [7]. Three critical points stand out of
this work. First, their work did not investigate the effects of each of the above four extensions
independently. Second, the method of [7] was re-implemented with sample interval lengths
far greater than those originally designed for. The authors acknowledged this point as
being due to technical limitations; they did not have data available with appropriate sample
intervals. Third, an attack model was assumed although the validity of this assumption was
not investigated. It is reasonable to expect that an assumed attack model would often be
mismatched to real attacks. The effects of assuming a mismatched attack model are yet to
be investigated.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter a brief historical account of the literature was developed from two alternative
perspectives. Several seminal network traffic anomaly detection (also known as flow-based
intrusion detection) methods were discussed, setting the stage for the focus of this thesis
– detection with high-resolution time series. Whereas the previously discussed methods
operate with sample intervals no less than five minutes long, it is desirable to detect attacks
much more frequently. However, performing detection with millisecond sample intervals
presents new challenges. Two key approaches were detailed ([7] and [8]) that attempt to
address these challenges, thus forming the basis of this research.
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Chapter 4
Analysing Network Traffic Anomaly
Detection Algorithms
This chapter proposes a framework for analysing time series anomaly detection algorithms.
Each algorithm is decomposed into three constituent components, namely: windows, rep-
resentations, and deviations. Two state-of-the-art algorithms ([7] and [8]) that operate on
high-resolution time series are analysed in terms of the framework, allowing to highlight
their differences and suggest previously unexplored configurations of their components.
4.1 Deconstructing Detection Algorithms
In this section, it is proposed to decompose anomaly-based network intrusion detection
algorithms into three constituent components: windows, representations, and deviations.
This deconstruction allows to compare different detection algorithms within a consistent
framework. The central object processed by each of the three components is a time series;
i.e., a set of observations made sequentially in time (see Section 2.2 for an introduction to
the analysis of time series). A given time series is processed by each of the components as
follows:
1. Windows: Real-world time series are typically non-stationary; i.e., their statistical
properties evolve over time. However, stationarity is an important requirement for
26
4.1 Deconstructing Detection Algorithms
many statistical and signal processing techniques. A classical approach for dealing
with a non-stationary time series is to construct a sliding window such that each
sub-series observed within successive positions of the window is stationary.
2. Representations: Time series may be represented in different ways. A representation
attempts to capture the underlying characteristics of a time series in a small number
of parameters. Operations may then be performed on the representation rather than
the original time series. Two notable examples are the time-domain and frequency-
domain representations. Time series adopt a time-domain representation by default;
i.e., observations made at distinct points in time are stored in separate components of
a vector. The Fourier transform of a time series gives its frequency-domain representa-
tion; i.e., each component of a vector represents a distinct frequency present in the
time series. Since the time series of interest here are noisy and lack deterministic com-
ponents, statistical representations are deemed appropriate. That is, the probability
distribution of the time series is modelled by a parametrized family of distributions.
Different distributions emphasise different characteristics of a time series, therefore it
must be ensured that the choice of distribution is appropriate for a given time series.
3. Deviations: The deviation (or dissimilarity) between two time series is measured in
order to detect anomalies. Measuring deviations in the time-domain is not always
appropriate. Since different representations emphasise different underlying charac-
teristics of a time series, pairing appropriate deviation measures with appropriate
representations allows to pinpoint how exactly the dissimilarity between two time
series is to be measured for a given application. For example, in engineering appli-
cations it is often useful to compare time series in terms of their frequency-domain
representations.
A detector (or detection algorithm) is a combination of the above components into a sin-
gle consistent system. A typical detector operates as follows: two or more windows are
constructed on the original time series, usually a test window and one or more reference
windows; the sub-series observed within the windows are transformed into appropriately
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chosen representation(s); deviations are calculated between the represented reference and
test sub-series; finally, decisions are made according to the magnitude of the deviations.
Two different classes of detectors will be contrasted, local anomaly detectors and periodic
anomaly detectors, that detect distinct classes of anomalies.
Having described each component of a detection algorithm at a high-level, specific
components appropriate for operating with the time series of interest here will be detailed
next. Specifically, sliding windows to deal with non-stationarity, marginal distribution
models to deal with non-Gaussianity, and multi-aggregated representations to accommo-
date self-similarity. Thereafter, local and periodic anomaly detection algorithms will be
contrasted.
4.1.1 Sliding Windows
The majority of statistical and signal processing techniques operate under the assumption
that a given time series is stationary. However, time series found in the real-world are
often non-stationary. Provided a time series is at least locally stationary, i.e., its statistical
properties vary slowly with time, a standard approach is to construct a sliding window of
fixed length such that the sub-series observed within successive positions of the window
are stationary. More formally, consider a time series of N observations, x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ).
Supposing that x is locally stationary on intervals of fixed length L, construct a sliding
window of length L. For each position of the window m = 0,1, · · · , M −1 (where M is the
total number of window positions), the observed sub-series (xm+1, xm+2, · · · , xm+L) can be
assumed to be stationary. For an in-depth statistical treatment of locally stationary processes
see [30].
To further demonstrate the concept of local stationarity, the results of a brief numerical
experiment are plotted in Fig. 4.1. A zero-mean uncorrelated Gaussian time series with
changing variance was generated, shown in Fig. 4.1a. In Fig. 4.1b, its true variance, following
a sinusoidal function of time, is plotted (black dashed line), together with estimated variance
functions. The variance functions were estimated using the standard variance estimator
within sliding windows of lengths L ∈ {50,10000,30000} sample points. The experiment also
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(b)
Fig. 4.1. Locally estimating the changing variance in a time series. (a) A zero-mean uncorrelated Gaus-
sian time series with variance changing as a sinusoidal function of time. (b) The true variance (black
dashed line) and the variance estimated locally within windows of lengths L ∈ {50,10000,30000}
sample points.
demonstrates the difficulty in choosing L (if the true L is unknown) so that the sub-series are
both sufficiently long yet also stationary. With L = 50, the sub-series are stationary, however,
they are too short leading to a noisy result. With L = 30000, the sub-series are sufficiently
long, however, they are not stationary leading to a smooth but biased result. A good balance
is achieved at L = 10000 for this experiment.
4.1.2 Marginal Distribution Models
Network traffic time series sampled at intervals in the order of minutes appear to be
Gaussian-distributed with deterministic mean. However, as the sample interval short-
ens, the sampled time series becomes increasingly non-Gaussian. This notion is empirically
demonstrated via the plots in Fig. 4.2. The same network traffic data is sampled at widen-
ing intervals, starting at one millisecond and increasing to one second. Histograms of the
marginal distributions of the sampled time series are plotted together with fitted Gaussian
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Packets Per Time Unit (1 ms, 10 ms, 100 ms, 1000 ms)
Fig. 4.2. Demonstrating the intrinsic non-Gaussianity in network traffic time series. Histograms of
the marginal distribution of time series from the Auckland7 dataset [20] sampled with four different
interval lengths, along with fitted Gaussian probability density functions. The figure demonstrates
how the marginal distribution tends from non-Gaussian with shorter sample intervals (1 ms) to
Gaussian with wider sample intervals (1000 ms).
probability density functions. It is demonstrated that for shorter sample intervals, the Gaus-
sian fit is poorer since the histogram is skewed to the left. On the other hand, the Gaussian
curve provides a reasonable fit to the histogram for wider sample intervals.
To account for this intrinsic non-Gaussianity, it has been proposed in the literature to
model the marginal distribution of network traffic time series in addition to its second-order
properties. It has been empirically demonstrated that a Gamma distribution provides a
reasonable approximation to the true marginal distribution of the packet counts time series
for a variety of network configurations. The gamma marginal distribution model has been
implemented and demonstrated to effectively detect network attacks in [7, 31, 32]. Formally,
it is assumed that each observation xt of the time series is a realization of a random variable













for x,α,β> 0. Here, Γ( ·) denotes the gamma function, and α and β denote the shape and
scale parameters of the gamma distribution. The scale parameter β, as its name suggests,
simply scales the value of the random variable X t . By varying the shape parameter α, the
gamma distribution provides a smooth evolution from an exponential distribution (α< 1) to
a Gaussian distribution (α→∞). Since network traffic time series tend towards a Gaussian
distribution as the sample interval widens, the gamma distribution provides a reasonably
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accurate model over a wide range of sample interval lengths. This property will be further
utilized in the next section.
4.1.3 Multi-Aggregated Representations
Typical approaches to modelling time series require the selection of an appropriately sized
sample interval such that a phenomenon of interest best exhibits itself. However, in network
traffic time series, it is not a single sample interval length, but rather a range, that is of interest.
This is due to the property known as self-similarity. The intuitive idea is that self-similar
time series appear similar when viewed over intervals of differing lengths. Time series that
do not exhibit this property, when viewed over increasing lengths, tend very quickly towards
a constant deterministic function of time. Fig. 4.3 (adapted from the seminal work of Leland
et al. [33]) demonstrates this concept by comparing a self-similar and non-self-similar time
series sampled at widening intervals.
A more formal definition is as follows. Given the time series x, define the k-aggregated
time series x(k) to be the addition of all observations xt within non-overlapping intervals of
length k (= 1,2, · · ·). In other words, the nth observation of the k-aggregated time series is
defined as x(k)n = xk(n−1)+1+xk(n−1)+2+·· ·+xk(n−1)+k . A process is said to be self-similar if for
all positive integer k, the original time series x is equivalent to the k-aggregated time series
x(k) in distribution; i.e., all of their finite-dimensional joint distributions are equivalent. The
rows of Fig. 4.3 are in fact plots of the original time series x sampled at one millisecond
intervals followed by three k-aggregated time series x(k) for k ∈ {10,100,1000}. The process
of aggregating the time series is the same as sampling the underlying data within wider
intervals. Since x was sampled within one millisecond intervals, x(k) corresponds to the
same data sampled within k millisecond intervals. The concept illustrated in the figure is
due to the property that the variance of a self-similar process decays as a power law of k,
whereas that of a non-self-similar process decays exponentially fast in k [33].
Network traffic time series are self-similar, thus their covariance does not decay expo-
nentially fast in k [33]. It has therefore been proposed in the literature to model network
traffic time series at multiple aggregation levels k (correspondingly, at multiple sample inter-
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(h) Interval Length = 1000 ms
Fig. 4.3. A brief numerical experiment adapted from [33] visualising the effect of self-similarity in a
time series. (a), (c), (e), (g) Number of packets received per interval, sampled from the Auckland 7
dataset [20] with four different interval lengths. (b), (d), (f), (h) Time series synthetically generated
by fitting a gamma distribution to the original time series in (a) and aggregating. Both time series
appear similar at 1 millisecond intervals. However, as the sample interval widens, the synthetic time
series converges to a constant value much faster than the real time series. This effect is due to the
self-similarity present in the original time series.
val lengths). Given a time series x, the k-aggregated time series are constructed for some
pre-defined values of k. Thereafter, the collection of aggregated time series x(k) is modelled
together. This approach has been combined with the gamma marginal distribution model
in [7] to improve Denial-of-Service (DoS) detection accuracy.
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Fig. 4.4. An example demonstrating the windowing process of a local anomaly detector on the MAWI
dataset [34]. The reference sub-series xrefm of length Nref (= 10 seconds), is observed within the blue
window starting at 14:00:40. The test sub-series xtestm of length Ntest (= 5 seconds) is observed within
the red window starting at 14:00:50.
4.1.4 Local Versus Periodic Anomaly Detectors
Anomalies can be thought of as observations where some model of normality – what is
regarded as normal – breaks down. In this section, it is proposed that Scherrer et al. [7]
and Simmross-Wattenberg et al. [8] detect two distinct classes of anomalies, each being an
instance where a different assumption about stationarity breaks down, more specifically,
local stationarity and periodic stationarity assumptions. For an introductory discussion
to the concepts of local stationartiy and periodic stationarity, the reader is referred to
Section 2.2.
Local anomaly detectors, as the name suggests, attempt to identify where an assumption
of local stationarity breaks down. This class of algorithms operates as follows. It is assumed
that a time series x is locally stationary; i.e., stationary on intervals of length L. Therefore,
two contiguous (touching each other at the borders) and synchronous (moving together)
sliding windows are constructed: the reference window of length Nref and the test window
of length Ntest (where Nref +Ntest = L). At each position of the window (m = 0,1, · · · , M −1),
the reference sub-series is given by xrefm = (xm+1, xm+2, · · · , xm+Nref ) and the test sub-series is
given by xtestm = (xm+Nref+1, xm+Nref+2, · · · , xm+Nref+Ntest ). This formulation has been visualized
in Fig. 4.4 to further clarify the idea.
Due to the local stationarity assumption, both sub-series are stationary; since they are
contiguous, they share the same statistical properties. Anomalies are detected by identifying
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xtestmxrefm, 1xrefm, 2xrefm, 3xrefm, 4xrefm, 5xrefm, 6
Fig. 4.5. An example demonstrating the windowing process of a periodic anomaly detector on the
Waikato ISPDSL2 dataset [20]. For a given test sub-series xtestm of length Ntest (= 1 hour) starting on
Sunday at 19:00, J (= 6) reference sub-series are observed, {xrefm,1, · · · ,xrefm,J } each of length Nref (= 1 hour)
shifted integer multiples of the period P (= 1 day) before the test sub-series.
share the same statistical properties. Therefore, detection is performed by computing the
deviation between appropriately chosen representations of the sub-series xrefm and x
test
m , and
comparing with a pre-defined threshold value.
On the other hand, periodic detectors attempt to identify where an assumption of pe-
riodic stationarity breaks down. In this case, it is assumed that a given time series x is
both locally stationary on intervals of length L and periodically stationary with period
P . A collection of synchronous sliding windows are constructed, each of length L: a sin-
gle test window, and multiple reference windows shifted from the test window by inte-
ger multiples of P . For the mth position of the windows, the test sub-series is given by
xtestm = (xm+1, xm+2, · · · , xm+L)T, and the corresponding collection of reference sub-series are
given by xrefm, j = (xm− j P+1, xm− j P+2, · · · , xm− j P+L)T ( j = 1,2, · · · , J). The number of reference
sub-series J depends on the number of periods of data available. An example demonstrating
the construction of reference and test sub-series for a periodic anomaly detector has been
visualized in Fig. 4.5.
For each successive m, due to the assumed local stationarity, each sub-series xtestm and





share the same statistical properties. The algorithm identifies anomalies where xtestm and
xrefm, j do not share the same statistical properties. Thus, a deviation is calculated between
appropriately chosen representations of the test sub-series and each reference sub-series.
The collection of J deviation values (one for each reference sub-series) must be combined
in order to make a final decision as to whether periodic stationarity has broken down.
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4.2 Constructing Detection Algorithms
In the previous sections, certain elements of detection algorithms were described indepen-
dently. Two state-of-the-art algorithms (those of Scherrer et al. [7] and Simmross-Wattenberg
et al. [8]) will now be analysed in terms of the described elements, thus placed within a
consistent framework. The analysis allows to identify exactly how and where the algorithms
differ and to propose previously unexplored configurations of their components.
4.2.1 Local Detection Algorithm (Scherrer et al.)
As mentioned in Section 4.1.4, Scherrer et al.’s algorithm [7] can be considered a local
anomaly detection algorithm. Recall that local anomaly detectors attempt to identify
where an assumption of local stationarity breaks down. Therefore, two contiguous and
synchronous sliding windows are constructed: the reference window and the test window.
At each position of the windows (m = 0,1, · · · , M −1), the reference sub-series is denoted by
xrefm and the test sub-series is denoted by x
test
m . Detection is performed as follows for each
successive position, m, of the windows. Due to the self-similarity exhibited by network
traffic time series, the sub-series are represented at multiple aggregation levels; i.e., xrefm and
xtestm are each aggregated K times with dyadically increasing interval lengths, giving x
ref
m,k and
xtestm,k for k = 0,1, · · · ,K .
Next, the marginal distribution of each xrefm,k and x
test
m,k is approximated by a Gamma
distribution. The model is fitted via maximum likelihood estimation, giving the estimated













parameters corresponding to each sub-series can be considered as a vector, where each




























m,1, · · · ,βtestm,K
)
. (4.2d)
The deviation between the reference and test sub-series is then calculated as the L2
distance between corresponding parameter vectors. A separate deviation is calculated for
the shape and scale parameters1
d (α)m =
∥∥∥αrefm −αtestm ∥∥∥2 , (4.3a)
d (β)m =
∥∥∥βrefm −βtestm ∥∥∥2 . (4.3b)
The algorithm takes into consideration the local stationarity using sliding windows,
non-Gaussianity using the gamma distribution model, and self-similarity using the multi-
aggregated representation.
4.2.2 Periodic Detection Algorithm (Simmross-Wattenberg et al.)
In contrast to the previously described algorithm, Simmross-Wattenberg et al.’s [8] can be
considered a periodic anomaly detection algorithm (as argued in Section 4.1.4). Therefore, a
collection of synchronous sliding windows are constructed, each of length L: a single test
window, and multiple reference windows shifted from the test window by integer multiples
of P . For a given window position m, we have a test sub-series xtestm and J corresponding
reference sub-series xref,H0m, j . The superscript H0 has been included here to indicate that the
reference sub-series is assumed to be benign. Each reference benign sub-series xref,H0m, j is
superposed with an attack time series to give a reference attack sub-series xref,H1m, j . Each
reference sub-series (benign and attack) is modelled by an alpha-stable distribution giving
the alpha-stable parameter vectors θref,H0m, j for the benign reference sub-series and θ
ref,H1
m, j for
the attack reference sub-series.
1∥x∥2 denotes the L2 norm of a vector x, thus
∥∥x−y∥∥2 denotes the L2 distance between vectors x and y of
the same dimension.
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The deviations dm, j ( j = 1,2, · · · , J), each corresponding to a different reference sub-series,
are then combined, in this case by simply considering only their maximum
dm = max
j
dm, j , (4.5)
giving the final anomaly score for the mth window position.
4.2.3 Unexplored Algorithms
The analyses carried out in the previous sections allow to identify that the algorithm of
Simmross-Wattenberg et al. [8] differs from Scherrer et al.’s algorithm [7] in five independent
ways:
1. Periodic anomaly detection is performed, rather than local anomaly detection.
2. Attack information is assumed, rather than only non-attack information.
3. The reference and/or test sub-series are modelled at a single aggregation level, rather
than multiple aggregation levels.
4. The alpha-stable marginal distribution model is assumed, rather than the gamma
marginal distribution model.
5. A likelihood-based deviation is computed for the test sub-series given the reference
parameters, rather than the L2 distance between reference and test parameter vectors.
We now propose to construct a “space”3 of algorithms that the above two inhabit. Denote
each of the above five independent differences by the following variables: W , denoting
2p(x|θ) denotes the conditional probability density function of the random variable X as a function of the
parameter vector θ, also known as the likelihood function.
3This usage of the word “space” does not refer to the rigorous definition of a vector space, although that
definition provides a useful way of thinking about the ideas presented here.
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Table 4.1. Summary of the variables constituting the “space” of unexplored detection algorithms.
Description Symbol Values Chapter
Windowing Procedure W {local, periodic} –
Information Availability I {incomplete, complete} Chapter 5
Multi-Aggregation Level Representation R1 {single, multi} Chapter 6
Marginal Distribution Model R2 {gamma, alpha-stable} –
Deviation D {L2 distance, likelihood} Chapter 6
the windowing procedure; I , denoting the available information; R1, denoting the multi-
aggregation level representation; R2, denoting the marginal distribution model; and D,
denoting the deviation. Each 5-tuple of the form (W, I ,R1,R2,D) specifies a unique detection
algorithm, for a total of 25 (= 32) unique algorithms, 30 of which are previously unexplored.
The following chapters will attempt to investigate this “space” of unexplored detection
algorithms as summarized in Table 4.1. The scope of this study is narrowed down to only
local rather than periodic anomaly detection algorithms. The effects of incomplete infor-
mation (I ) will be independently explored in Chapter 5. Initial numerical experiments with
the α-stable distribution found that the required experiments would take a total of 399
days to complete.4 Thus, only the gamma distribution model of R2 will be considered. The
remaining two variables, R1 and D , will be jointly explored in Chapter 6.
4.3 Summary
This chapter detailed the first contribution of this thesis. A framework was proposed to
deconstruct a class of anomaly detection algorithms into windows, representations, and
deviations. The framework was applied to two state-of-the-art algorithms ([7] and [8]),
allowing to identify five independent differences between them. By regarding each difference
as a variable, a “space” of previously unexplored detection algorithms was constructed. The
exploration of this “space” will be the focus of Chapters 5 and 6.
4The probability density function of the α-stable distribution is not available in closed-form. Therefore,
fitting the α-stable parameters to data, and evaluating its probability density function is much more computa-




Chapter 4 identified information availability, denoted by I ∈ {incomplete,complete}, as one
of five key differences between two state-of-the-art detection algorithms ([7] and [8]). Detec-
tion theory provides the necessary tools to quantify the effects of information availability on
detection accuracy. Therefore, this chapter investigates I by formulating volumetric Denial-
of-Service (DoS) detection as a signal detection problem – the detection of a signal (the
attack traffic) embedded in noise (the background traffic) – and comparing two detectors.
The first detector operates without knowledge of the attack model (I = incomplete) and the
second detector operates as if the attack model were known (I = complete).
5.1 Network Traffic Data
Numerical experiments are performed on real network traffic superposed with synthetically
generated attacks. The benign dataset used here is from network traffic observed as part of
the Measurement and Analysis of the WIDE Internet (MAWI) project [34]. The MAWI sample
point F connects several Japanese research institutes and universities to the Internet. The
archive offers 15 minutes of traffic from 14:00 to 14:15 (Japanese Standard Time) every day of
the year since the year 2000. Packet payloads are removed and IP addresses are anonymized.
The MAWI archive has proven tremendously useful for network traffic analysis research;
an incomplete list of recent work using the archive includes [31, 32, 35–39]. The present
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numerical experiments were performed on the particular traffic trace from Tuesday 25th July
2017, containing roughly 121 million packets transferred at an average rate of 974 Mbps.
Synthetic attacks were used, similar to [7] and [8]. In particular, the authors of [8]
simulated flooding attacks using iPerf [28] (a network bandwidth measurement tool) on a
quiet network, and superposed the resulting pure attack traffic on real recorded background
traffic. Those authors acknowledge that this approximation does not take into account
the changing behaviour of the underlying network protocols under the effect of the attack.
However, they demonstrated that the marginal distribution of the superposed time series
reasonably approximates that of a real attack time series [8, Fig. 4]. In this study, attacks have
been further approximated as a step function in time - zero before the attack starts and some
non-negative amplitude thereafter - rather than simulated via tools such as iPerf. The reason
for this approximation is as follows. By definition, a volumetric denial of service attack
floods a service with meaningless packets, thus the time series of packet counts rapidly
rises to a maximum - the peak capacity allowed by the network - and remains there for the
duration of the attack. In other words, the time series of a volumetric denial of service attack
is well-approximated by a step function in time. Note, however, that this approximation
does not necessarily generalise to other variations of the attack.
5.2 Detection Theoretic Formulation
Detection theory provides the tools required to quantify the effects of information availability
on detection accuracy. Formulated within the framework of detection theory, the problem is
to detect whether a signal (DoS attack traffic) is present in noise (background traffic).
5.2.1 Denial-of-Service Detection Problem
The time series of interest is the number of packets arriving at the network within non-
overlapping one millisecond intervals, denoted by w = (w1, w2, · · · , wNtotal). As in Section 4.1.2,
the gamma marginal distribution model is assumed. Formally, it is assumed that each wn
(n = 1,2, · · · , Ntotal) is sampled from a gamma distribution defined by the probability density
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Fig. 5.1. A schematic description of the windowing procedure for a time series of length Ntotal (= 10)
sample points. A sliding window is started at the initial position m = 0 (not shifted). The first Nref (= 3)
sample points of the window comprise the reference sub-series, represented by the grey circles; and
the next Ntest (= 2) sample points comprise the test sub-series, represented by the black circles. White
circles represent sample points that are not processed for a given window position. The window is
shifted by Nshift (= 1) sample points to give the next position m = 1 (shifted once). The process is
repeated for a total of M window positions.
function












for wn ,αn ,βn > 0. Here, Γ(·) denotes the gamma function, and αn and βn denote the shape
and scale parameters of the gamma distribution.
Furthermore, wn is assumed to be locally stationary (as discussed in Section 4.1.1);
i.e., the parameters αn and βn are assumed to vary slowly with respect to n. Therefore, A
reference window of length Nref and a test window of length Ntest are constructed, and shifted
across the time series by Nshift sample points in each iteration. Nref and Ntest are chosen
such that wn observed within the window are stationary (αn and βn are approximately
constant for n within the window). For each position of the window m = 0, · · · , M −1, the
sample points (n = mNshift +1, · · · ,mNshift +Nref) comprise the reference sub-series and the
sample points (n = mNshift +Nref +1, · · · ,mNshift +Nref +Ntest) comprise the test sub-series.
Fig. 5.1 provides a schematic description of the windowing procedure, demonstrated for an
example time series of 10 sample points. Selection of appropriate values for Nref, Ntest, and
Nshift will be guided in Section 5.3.1.
The detection problem is the same for each successive window position m. Without loss
of generality, the case m = 0 will be considered here for notational simplicity. The detection
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problem is to distinguish whether an attack appears in the background traffic time series
wn . The attack is modelled as an additive step function in time - zero before the attack
starts and with amplitude Aw̄ 1 thereafter (the last paragraph of Section 5.1 discusses the
argument supporting this modelling assumption), where A > 0 denotes the attack intensity;
i.e., the ratio of the attack pack rate to the benign packet rate. The problem is therefore to
distinguish between the two hypotheses:
H0 : xn = wn , (5.2a)
H1 : xn = Aw̄ +wn , (5.2b)
for n = Nref +1, · · · , Nref +Ntest. Due to the assumed local stationarity, and provided Ntest is
chosen appropriately, wn are identically gamma-distributed with parameters α and β; i.e.,
the parameters are no longer n-dependent within the window. The parameters α and β
are unknown. However, it is assumed that the reference sub-series (x1, · · · , xNref), consists
only of noise, from which α and β can be estimated provided Nref is sufficiently large. The
next section defines two detectors to solve this problem with differing levels of available
information.
5.2.2 Defining the Detectors
Detection problems are typically solved by optimizing a specified criterion. Two fundamen-
tal criteria include Bayes risk and the Neyman-Pearson (NP) criterion. Bayes risk assigns a
prior probability to each hypothesis and a cost to each possible decision outcome. When it
is difficult to assume prior probabilities or error costs, the NP criterion is appropriate, which
attempts to maximise the probability of detection, PD, for a given probability of false alarm,
PFA. It is well known that optimizing either criterion leads to detectors of the same general
form; i.e., the likelihood ratio test (LRT) [13].
1x̄ denotes the the arithmetic mean of the N -dimensional vector x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ); i.e., x̄ = (∑Nn=1 xn)/N .
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Denoting an observed test sub-series by x = (xNref+1, xNref+2, · · · , xNref+Ntest), the LRT de-
cides H1 if
Λ(x) = pX|H1 (x|H1)
pX|H0 (x|H0)
> η. (5.3)
In (5.3), Λ(x) denotes the likelihood ratio, η denotes the threshold value, and pX|H0 (x|H0)
and pX|H1 (x|H1) denote the conditional PDFs of x under each hypothesis. In the Bayesian
approach, η is defined in terms of the assumptions about error costs and prior probabilities,
whereas in the NP approach, η is defined such that a given PFA is achieved. Here, the choice
of criterion will be left arbitrary by referring in general to η.
In practice, it is rare that the attack model (and thus pX|H1 (x|H1)) will be known before
the occurrence of the attack. This challenge is a primary reason for the growing interest in
anomaly-based intrusion detection, which operates without an attack model. One such




where ξ is a threshold value. In contrast with (5.3), there is no optimality associated with
(5.4). However, Bishop [40] has shown that under certain assumptions about pX|H1 (x|H1),
(5.3) and (5.4) are equivalent detectors. The first, simpler assumption is that pX|H1 (x|H1) is
equal to a constant on the support of pX|H0 (x|H0). The second assumption is that pX|H1 (x|H1)
is of the form F (pX|H0 (x|H0)), where F (·) is a strictly decreasing function. Here, assumptions
about pX|H1 (x|H1) are implicitly contained within the threshold value ξ in (5.4).
These assumptions are not often appropriate in reality. Thus, the main contribution
of this chapter is to quantify the difference in detection accuracy between (5.3) and (5.4)
for a simple class of volumetric DoS attacks, thus investigating the effect of information
availability I on detection accuracy.
5.2.3 Measuring Detection Accuracy
A complete measure of detection accuracy is given by the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve; i.e., the curve obtained by observing the probability of false alarm PFA versus
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Table 5.1. Parameter settings used in the numerical experiments for exploring the effects of informa-
tion availability on detection accuracy.
Symbol Description Value(s)
Nref Reference window length 60 sec
Ntest Test window length 2k (k = 0,1, · · · ,11) sample points
Nshift Window shift length 0.1 sec
A Attack Intensity 0.01l (l = 1,2, · · · ,50)
the probability of detection PD, while varying the threshold λ. The ROC curve allows to
disentangle the assessment of a detector’s accuracy from problem-specific assumptions,
such as prior probabilities and error costs [13]. It is often useful to summarize accuracy
by computing the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC), ranging from 0.5, meaning that the
detector is no better than flipping a coin, to 1, meaning that the detector has perfect accuracy.
In the results to follow, detection accuracy is measured in terms of the AUC.
5.3 Results and Discussion
The purpose of these numerical experiments is to evaluate the detection accuracy of two
detectors for a constant-rate volumetric DoS attack as detailed in the previous section.
This section guides the selection of appropriate parameters, and thereafter discusses the
experimental results
5.3.1 Parameter Settings
The parameters used in this study are detailed in Table 5.1. These particular values were
chosen according to the following criteria:
1. The reference window length Nref was selected to attain a balance between avoiding
non-stationarity within each window position and providing a sufficient number of
samples so that model parameter estimation accuracy did not affect the results.
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2. The test window length Ntest was dyadically increased, until further increases resulted
in erratic detection accuracy (which the author suspects is due to introducing non-
stationarity into the test sub-series).
3. The window shift length Nshift ensured M ≈ 9000 window positions and therefore
detection opportunities per experiment, from which to reliably compute PFA and PD.
4. The attack intensity A was uniformly increased, such that any smaller lead to barely
detectable attacks, and any larger resulted in too easily detectable attacks.
5.3.2 AUC Versus Test Window Length
Each sub-figure in Fig. 5.2 fixes A and plots the AUC as a function of Ntest on a semi-
logarithmic axis. The blue curve corresponds to the detector with incomplete information
(I = incomplete), which for the present discussion will be referred to as Detector A . The
orange curve corresponds to the detector with complete information (I = complete), which
will be referred to as Detector B. For small intensities A < 5% (Fig. 5.2a), Detector A ’s
accuracy is roughly constant with respect to Ntest, whereas Detector B’s accuracy is increas-
ing and piecewise linear with a breakpoint at Ntest ∈ (200,300). Note that the piecewise
linearity is observed on a semi-logarithmic axis. The figure demonstrates that the accuracy
of Detector A remains poor with negligible improvement, despite a substantial increase in
the number of samples available for detection.
At A = 5% (Fig. 5.2b), Detector A ’s accuracy begins to increase with Ntest, however, the
difference between the two curves still increases with Ntest. The curve corresponding to
Detector A also shows approximate piecewise linearity (on the semi-logarithmic axis) with
the breakpoint at Ntest ∈ (200,300). When the intensity reaches A = 10% (Fig. 5.2c), Detector
B begins to saturate for Ntest ∈ (500,600); i.e., further increasing Ntest yields minimal increase
in accuracy. This observation is to be expected as detection accuracy draws nearer to perfect.
The saturation has the effect that at this intensity, the accuracy difference between the
detectors decreases for large Ntest.
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Fig. 5.2. Accuracy, in terms of AUC, versus logarithmically-scaled test window length Ntest of detectors
with varying information availability I ∈ {incomplete,complete}. (a) A = 1%. (b) A = 5%. (c) A = 10%.
(d) A = 15%.
Whereas for A < 15%, both curves have positive curvature, for A ≥ 15% (Fig. 5.2d), both
curves have negative curvature. At this intensity, Detector A begins to saturate for Ntest ∈
(500,600). For greater intensities than have been plotted here, no further notable changes are
observed; the curves draw increasingly nearer to each other as they asymptotically approach
perfect accuracy (AUC ∼ 1).
5.3.3 AUC Versus Attack Intensity
Each sub-figure in Fig. 5.3 fixes Ntest and plots the AUC as a function of A. As before, the
blue curve corresponds to Detector A (I = incomplete), and the orange curve corresponds
to Detector B (I = complete). While Detector B’s curve has positive curvature throughout,
Detector A ’s curve has negative curvature for small intensities (roughly A < 5%) and positive
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Fig. 5.3. Accuracy, in terms of AUC, versus attack intensity A of detectors with varying information
availability I ∈ {incomplete,complete}. (a) Ntest = 1 sample point. (b) Ntest = 1024 sample points.






Fig. 5.4. A measure, r̄ , of the difference in accuracy between Detector A and Detector B versus
attack intensity A. The spike at A = 40% is due to the fact r̄ is the arithmetic mean across random
experiments with gamma-distributed values. The gamma distribution provides higher likelihood to
extreme values than the classical Gaussian distribution, and the mean is not a robust statistic, i.e., its
value is biased by the presence of extreme values.
curvature thereafter. The negative curvature demonstrates a structural deficiency in Detector
A for small intensity attacks. For each fixed Ntest, both detectors’ accuracies saturate with
increasing A and the performance difference diminishes. As Ntest increases, the curves
appear to be increasingly compressed along the A-axis, giving the effect that the performance
difference diminishes at lower intensities.
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5.3.4 Performance Loss Measure
The performance difference is characterized in another way in Fig. 5.4. In order to describe
the function r̄ (A) plotted in the figure, the reader is first referred to Fig. 5.2c. For A =
10%, Detector B achieves an AUC of approximately 0.7 at Ntest = 1. Since the curve is
monotonically increasing, it can be said that Ntest = 1 is the minimum required value for
Detector B to achieve an AUC of 0.7. Similarly, Ntest ≈ 40 is the minimum required value
for Detector A to achieve the same AUC of 0.7. Denote by r (AUC, A) the ratio of minimum
required Ntest values to achieve a desired AUC. Continuing with the example, it follows that
r (0.7,10%) ≈ 40/1 = 40; i.e., for attacks of intensity A = 10%, Detector A requires a test
window length 40 times that of Detector B to achieve the same AUC of 0.7. Finally, denote
by r̄ (A) the average of r (AUC, A) over all AUC values, which has been plotted in the figure.
The curve in Fig. 5.4 demonstrates two key points. First, for small intensities, Detector A
requires a substantially larger Ntest than Detector B. Second, as the intensity increases,
r̄ (A) decays slowly; even at A = 50%, Detector A requires on average 1.5 times the Ntest of
Detector B.
5.4 Summary
This chapter quantified the effects of information availability, I ∈ {incomplete,complete},
on detection accuracy. Two detectors were constructed: one without an attack model (I =
incomplete) and one with an attack model (I = complete). The detectors were evaluated
and compared in order to investigate the effects of varying information availability I on
detection accuracy. Three key findings were as follows. First, the inferior accuracy in the
case I = incomplete is most notable for attacks of small intensities (A < 5%). Second, the
accuracy of both detectors appears to undergo a structural change around A = 15%. Third,
the performance difference decays as A increases, however at a slow rate; at a high attack
intensity (A = 50%), Detector A still requires 1.5 times as many samples for detection than





Chapter 4 identified five key differences between two state-of-the-art detection algorithms
([7] and [8]). This chapter investigates two of these differences by constructing four detectors
with varying representation, denoted by R ∈ {single,multi}, and varying deviation, denoted
by D ∈ {l2-distance,likelihood}. Each detector is evaluated in a series of numerical
experiments, allowing to assess the effects of the variables R and D on detection accuracy.
6.1 Network Traffic Data
Two separate sets of data are required for the present numerical experiments: the benign
data, assumed to be mostly free of malicious activity; and the attack data, assumed to consist
mostly of malicious activity. A hypothetical scenario is created by superposing the attack
data on the benign data. Since the starting and ending times of the attack are known, the
data are considered labelled. The benign and attack data used in this chapter are from two
separate network traffic archives.
The benign data are from the MAWI network traffic archive (also utilised and described
in Section 5.1). For the present numerical experiments, data from 14 consecutive Tuesdays
were used – starting from 25th July 2017 and ending on 24th October 2017. The attack data are
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Table 6.1. Summary of the benign datasets from the MAWI network traffic archive [34].
Index Date Packet Rate (pkt/s) Bit Rate (Mb/s)
1 25/07/2017 135 974
2 01/08/2017 124 825
3 08/08/2017 101 633
4 15/08/2017 92 507
5 22/08/2017 117 670
6 29/08/2017 119 757
7 05/09/2017 101 590
8 12/09/2017 105 637
9 19/09/2017 110 692
10 26/09/2017 139 973
11 03/10/2017 137 965
12 10/10/2017 133 973
13 17/10/2017 139 968
14 24/10/2017 132 970
from the Booters dataset: network traffic measured as part of a collaboration between the
Dutch National Research and Education Network (SURFnet) and the University of Twente. A
series of volumetric UDP-based Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks were launched
at a null-routed IP address at the university. The attacks originated from DDoS-for-hire
services, colloquially termed booters. Initial investigations identified twenty one potential
booters, of which seven had faulty payment systems. Of the fourteen remaining booters:
three did not send any traffic, and two sent a handful of TCP packets. The final nine booters
performed attacks as requested, generating more than 250 GB of traffic in total. Seven of
the attacks were DNS-based reflected and amplified DDoS attacks; and two of the attacks
were CharGen reflected and amplified DDoS attacks. The benign and attack datasets are
summarised in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively.
Each raw network traffic packet dataset (in .pcap file format) was processed to obtain
the time series of packet counts Thereafter, each attack time series was superposed on each
benign time series for a total of 126 (= 14×9) benign-attack pairs. The next section will detail
the approach taken to evaluate each detector on each superposed time series.
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Table 6.2. Summary of the attack datasets from the Booters network traffic archive [41].
Index Packet Rate (pkt/s) Bit Rate (Mb/s) Attack Sources
1 46 700 4486
2 32 250 78
3 48 330 54
4 64 1190 2970
5 8 6 8281
6 83 150 7379
7 36 320 6075
8 54 990 281
9 86 5480 3779
6.2 Experimental Approach
Four detectors are considered here, obtained by varying representation, R ∈ {single,multi},
and deviation, D ∈ {l2-distance,likelihood} (see Chapter 4 for further details). This
section describes the approach taken to evaluate a single detector run on a single labelled
time series (i.e., with known attack start and end times).
6.2.1 Evaluating Detectors
The reader is encouraged to supplement the following description with the visual aid pre-
sented in Fig. 6.1. By stating that a given time series x is “labelled” we are indicating that
the attack start time τ1 and attack end time τ2 (also known as the changepoints) are known.
The goal of the detection algorithm is to correctly estimate τ1 and τ2 given only x. Applying
the algorithms constructed in Chapter 4 to a time series x results in a sequence of deviation
scores dt , where t denotes the discrete point in time. Since the algorithms considered here
are local anomaly detection algorithms, dt can be interpreted as a measure of how likely it is
that the local stationarity assumption was broken. It is expected that dt should peak nearby
an actual changepoint; i.e., t = τi (i = 1,2). Following previous work [42], each peak in the
deviations sequence is considered an estimate of the changepoints {τi }.
In order to reduce the number of false positives, only peaks with values greater than











Fig. 6.1. Visualising the evaluation of a detector on a labelled time series. (a) A labelled time series x
with an attack starting at τ1 and ending at τ2. (b) The deviation scores dt output by a detector. Peaks
in dt occur at times Tn . Those peaks within the allowed bands (shaded in blue) are considered true
positives (green squares), otherwise they are considered false positives (red circles). If a threshold
is applied, then only peaks with dTn greater than a predefined threshold value λ are considered as
potential alarms. The labels yn for the three peaks identified in the figure are (0,1,0).
nth peak in dt by Tn , Tn is only considered an alarm if dTn > λ. Since the time series data
used here were sampled at millisecond intervals, it is perhaps too much to expect Tn to
correspond exactly with τi . Instead, a band of, say ±5 seconds, is allowed; detecting an
attack 5 seconds after it occurs is considered a valid detection. In summary, an estimated
changepoint Tn with value larger than the threshold (dTn >λ) is considered a true positive if
Tn ∈ [τi −5sec,τi +5sec] for i = 1,2, otherwise, Tn is considered a false positive. It will be
useful to construct a label variable, yn , which is equal to 1 if the nth peak is a true positive,
and 0 if it is a false positive. The result of each numerical experiment; i.e., the application of a
given detector to a given labelled time series can therefore be summarized by a collection of
estimated changepoints with times {Tn}, values {dTn }, and labels {yn}. From these quantities,
the evaluation metrics discussed in the next section may be computed.
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6.2.2 Measuring Detection Accuracy
Detection accuracy is measured here by the Area Under the Receiver Operating Character-
istic Curve (AUC), ranging from 0.5, meaning that the detector is no better than flipping
a coin, to 1, meaning that the detector has perfect accuracy. While the AUC summarizes
the entire Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, in certain cases only the region
of the curve for very small PFA is of interest. Consider the following example. Each detec-
tion algorithm has a decision rate, rdec, the rate at which it makes decisions as to whether
an attack has occurred or not. For the parameters used in this chapter, the decision rate
rdec = 8640 decisions per day. The error rate, rerr, the rate at which incorrect decisions are
made, is determined by the probability of false alarm and decision rate as rerr = PFArdec.
Fixing some probability of false alarm, say PFA = 0.1, meaning that 10% of all decisions will
be incorrect, yields an error rate of rerr = (0.1)(8640) = 864, errors per day! False alarms are
considerably costly since they require time and effort to be diagnosed by a team of experts.
A more reasonable error rate would be in the order of one error per day. To achieve this error
rate would require PFA = rerr/rdec = 1/8640 ≈ 10−4. Therefore, in addition to the AUC, which
summarizes the ROC curve over all possible PFA, we will assess the PD for a given PFA = 10−4,
which yields an error rate of approximately one error per day; a practical yet considerably
more stringent assessment than the AUC. Thus far, only the evaluation for a single dataset
has been covered. The next section will detail the evaluation across many different benign
and attack datasets.
6.2.3 Experiments Across Multiple Datasets
Thus far the discussion has focused on a single numerical experiment; i.e., a single detector
applied to a labelled time series obtained by superposing an attack time series on a benign
time series. However, the analysis is performed across 14 different benign datasets, 9
different attack time series, and 4 different detectors.
A useful quantity for parametrizing DoS attacks is the attack intensity; i.e., the ratio
of the attack packet rate to the benign packet rate. The attack intensity is expected to be
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Fig. 6.2. Box plots of the attack intensity aggregated across datasets. (a) Attack intensity of benign
datasets, sorted in increasing order of intensity, aggregated across attack datasets. (b) Attack intensity
of attack datasets, sorted in increasing order of intensity, aggregated across benign datasets.
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correlated with the detection accuracy; attacks of lower intensity are harder to detect, while
attacks of higher intensity are easier to detect. The attack intensity has been calculated
for each possible benign-attack pair. Fig. 6.2 shows box plots of the attack intensities
aggregated (separately) across all benign and attack datasets and ordered by increasing
intensity. Fig. 6.2b illustrates that the attack intensity varies over a similar range (0% to
at least 60%) for each benign dataset. Fig. 6.2a shows that for a given attack dataset the
attack intensity does not vary much across benign datasets. Given these two observations,
it would be reasonable to separate the analyses by attack dataset (indirectly separating
by attack intensity). That is, for each attack time series (correspondingly, attack intensity)
experimental results will be aggregated across all benign time series. This will be repeated
for each detector, and their results will be compared. Aggregating across multiple benign
datasets also potentially reduces biases that may be present in a single dataset, e.g., a certain
detector may perform better in one benign dataset but not others.
6.3 Results and Discussion
The results obtained by performing the numerical experiments described in the previous
section are now detailed. Each of the four detectors is evaluated on each combination
of benign and attack time series. The detectors are evaluated in terms of their accuracy,
measured by the AUC in addition to the probability of detection, PD, for a given probability
of false alarm, PFA = 10−4, chosen such that the resultant error rate is in the order of one
error per day, a manageable quantity. First, parameter settings are guided Thereafter, results
are presented for detectors with varying representation, R ∈ {single,multi}, and deviation,
D ∈ {l2-distance,likelihood}.
6.3.1 Parameter Settings
For each benign-attack time series pair, the attack time series is superposed at 1000 different
starting times, in order to avoid any bias caused by only detecting attacks that occur at the
same time. A further advantage is that the number of numerical experiments is increased,
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Table 6.3. Parameter settings used in the numerical experiments for exploring the effects of represen-
tations and deviations on detection accuracy.
Symbol Description Value
Nref Reference window length 60 sec
Ntest Test window length 10 sec
Nshift Window shift 10 sec
− Aggregation factor 2
K Aggregation levels 7
− Changepoint interval 5 sec
thus increasing the number of detection attempts made by each detector, which provides a
higher resolution ROC curve. This is necessary in order to obtain the PD for a PFA as low as is
required (10−4).
The detector parameters used for the present numerical experiments are presented in
Table 6.3. Each parameter is chosen according to the following criteria:
1. The reference window length, Nref, and test window length, Ntest, should be chosen
such that sub-series observed within intervals of length Nref + Ntest are stationary.
Additionally, each window should be long enough to provide a minimum number of
required samples by any statistical techniques utilised.
2. The window shift length Nshift determines the decision rate – the rate at which detec-
tion attempts occur and attacks may be detected. A higher decision rate is of course
desirable, however, also requires increasingly smaller PFA to avoid impractically high
error rates. Furthermore, the computational cost is proportional to the decision rate.
3. For detectors with R = multi, the aggregation factor – the length of the intervals within
which the time series is successively aggregated – should be chosen as per [7, 31]. The
maximum aggregation level K – the maximum number of times the time series is
successively aggregated – should be chosen as large as possible while still yielding
aggregated sub-series with a sufficient number of samples required to fit a gamma
probability distribution.
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Fig. 6.3. Accuracy of detectors with fixed deviation, D = l2-distance, and varied representation R.
(a) Probability of detection PD for fixed probability of false alarm PFA = 10−4. (b) AUC.
4. The length of the interval surrounding changepoints within which an alarm is con-
sidered a true positive should be set between 5 and 10 seconds, following previous
work [42].
6.3.2 Non-monotonicity of Accuracy Versus Attack Dataset
It is interesting to note that the accuracy (measured in terms of both AUC and PD) versus
attack dataset does not monotonically increase in all of the presented figures: Fig. 6.3,
Fig. 6.4, Fig. 6.5, and Fig. 6.6. This non-intuitive behaviour is due to the fact that the ordering
of attack datasets by increasing intensity - i.e., ratio of attack packet rate to benign packet
rate - does not necessarily reflect the true difficulty of detecting an attack in all cases. In
particular, Attack Dataset 5, appears to be at least as difficult to detect as Attack Dataset 3
and perhaps also Attack Dataset 2. While this suggests that the dynamics of Attack Dataset
5 might be worth further investigating, the ordering by attack intensity is retained, as no
technically consistent alternative presented itself.
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Fig. 6.4. Accuracy of detectors with fixed deviation, D = likelihood, and varied representation R.
(a) Probability of detection PD for fixed probability of false alarm PFA = 10−4. (b) AUC.
6.3.3 Single Versus Multiple Aggregation Levels
The first variable to be investigated is the representation. Detectors with fixed deviation,
D = l2-distance, and varied representation R ∈ {single,multi} are compared in terms
of their PD and AUC in Fig. 6.3. Each detector here returns two outputs, corresponding
to the shape and scale parameters of the gamma distribution, treated as two separate
detectors (see Chapter 4 for further details). All detectors are incapable of detecting attacks
given the required PFA. However, scale parameter detectors are capable of detecting the
largest intensity attack. Varying R has negligible effect. In terms of the AUC, scale parameter
detectors perform better for larger intensity attacks, whereas shape parameter detectors with
R = single perform slightly better for lower intensity attacks. Setting R = multi improves
the accuracy for scale parameter detectors (green to blue) – particularly for low intensity
attacks – while worsening the accuracy for shape parameter detectors (red to orange). The
curves in Fig. 6.4 correspond to detectors obtained by fixing D = likelihood and varying R .
Here, the effect of varying R is negligible in terms of both the PD and the AUC.
In summary, it appears that varying R does not have much effect on detection accuracy
as measured by PD. However, setting R = multi improves accuracy for scale parameter
detectors and worsens accuracy for shape parameter detectors in terms of AUC. Interestingly,
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Fig. 6.5. Accuracy of detectors with fixed representation, R = single, and varied deviation D. (a)
Probability of detection PD for fixed probability of false alarm PFA = 10−4. (b) AUC.
the shape parameter has higher AUC for larger intensity attacks, whereas the scale parameter
is more sensitive for lower intensity attacks.
6.3.4 L2 Distance Versus Likelihood
Fig. 6.5 plots the accuracy for detectors with fixed R = single and varied D. While for
D = l2-distance, no detectors are capable of detecting attacks given the required PFA, for
D = likelihood, a near perfect AUC of 1 is achieved for all but the lowest intensity attack.
Finally, Fig. 6.6 plots the accuracy for detectors with fixed R = multi and varied D. A
similar pattern is observed to the previous figure, except in this case the gap between D =
likelihood and D = l2-distance detectors is narrower, further evidencing that setting R =
multi pairs well with D = l2-distance, though does not seem to affect D = likelihood.
6.4 Summary
This chapter explored the space of detection algorithms identified in Chapter 4. Each
detector was evaluated in terms of the area under the ROC curve (AUC) and probability
of detection PD for a fixed PFA. The detectors were evaluated on 9 attack datasets, each
superposed on 14 benign datasets, giving a total of 126 labelled datasets. Two variables
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Fig. 6.6. Accuracy of detectors with fixed representation, R = multi, and varied deviation D. (a)
Probability of detection PD for fixed probability of false alarm PFA = 10−4. (b) AUC.
were assesed through the evaluations: representation, denoted by R ∈ {single,multi}, and
deviation, denoted by D ∈ {l2-distance,likelihood}. Three key findings were as follows.
First, varying R has little effect for D = likelihood detectors. Second, setting R = multi
negatively affects D = l2-distance detectors based on the shape parameter, while positively
affecting those based on the scale parameter. Third, overall, D = likelihood is superior to




The aim of this thesis is to provide an underlying theory for understanding a single class of
cyber-attack detection algorithms. This section will recall how each contribution presented
in this thesis aligns with the original aim.
Chapter 4 proposed a framework for deconstructing detection algorithms into windows,
representations, and deviations. The framework was then applied to two state-of-the-art
algorithms, allowing to identify five key differences between them. By regarding each
difference as a variable, a class of detection algorithms was constructed. In particular, the
framework allowed to link the type of anomalies detected by each detector to a distinct
assumption about the observed time series; i.e., local or periodic stationarity.
Chapter 5 investigated the effect of information availability on detection accuracy. In
order to do so, a simple problem – detection of a constant-rate Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attack – was modelled within the framework of detection theory. By explicitly modelling the
probability distribution of the observed data under two scenarios (no attack present versus
attack present), and constructing detectors that operate with and without attack information,
we were able to quantify the effect of information availability on detection accuracy. It was
found that the attack information particularly helps the detector discriminate when the
data cannot be easily identified as an attack or not; i.e., when the attack intensity is low.
Furthermore, while the effect decays as the attack intensity grows, it does so at a slow rate, i.e.,
at a high attack intensity (50%) detection without attack information still requires 1.5 times
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as many samples as detection with attack information in order to match its performance on
average.
Finally, Chapter 6 proposed an experimental procedure to jointly investigate the effects
of the representation and deviation of the detector on its accuracy. Interestingly, it was found
that moving from single- to multiple- aggregation levels provided negligible improvement
in detection accuracy, in some cases notably degrading the accuracy. Further, it was found
that the likelihood deviation greatly outperformed the L2 distance between parameters of a
fitted probability distribution (supported by results in detection theory [13]).
In summary, a framework was proposed to deconstruct detection algorithms into their
constituent components. The framework was applied to a class of detection algorithms,
allowing to construct a “space” – each point in the space corresponding to a distinct con-
figuration of detector components. By exploring this space, and leveraging notions from
detection theory, we gained deeper insights into a class of detection algorithms.
Future Work
Five directions for further research have been identified:
1. Of the five key differences identified between the studied algorithms, two were ex-
cluded: periodic anomaly detection, and the alpha-stable marginal distribution model.
Expanding the class of algorithms studied here to include these aspects is the first
proposed direction of further research.
2. The present investigation considered algorithms that each operate on a single time
series x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ). These algorithms are capable of detecting points in time n
(= 1,2, · · · , N ) where an attack might have occurred. However, extending the class of
algorithms to operate on multiple time series {x1,x2, · · · ,xM } each corresponding to
a distinct IP address, would allow to identify users m (= 1,2, · · · , M) responsible for
an attack. Considering the IP address as a spatial component, joint spatio-temporal
analysis techniques could be used to identify both the point in time n and the user m
responsible for malicious activity.
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3. Windows with adaptive shifts, widths, and shapes could be explored. Denote the shift
and width of the mth window by Sm and Nm , respectively. Let the special case where
Sm = S and Nm = N correspond to fixed shifts and widths. The values of Sm and Nm
could be adaptively computed based on statistical properties of the observed traffic.
For example, during periods of high activity, Sm and Nm could be decreased for a finer
analysis, and during extended periods of low activity, Sm and Nm could be increased.
Furthermore, increasingly more complex window shapes can be designed in regard to
their tapering properties.
4. The simplistic attack model assumed in Chapter 5 can be extended to better reflect the
effects of the attack on the underlying network protocols. For instance, the proposed
detection theoretic formulation provides a platform to utilize previous work on the
spectral characterization of DoS attacks [43] for enhanced detection. The framework
can also easily be extended to attacks other than the DoS attack.
5. Furthermore, the attack model was assumed here to be either completely known or
unknown. It is perhaps unrealistic to know the attack model completely before the
attack occurs. Therefore, the effects of an attack model mismatch could be studied.
This would allow to identify under which conditions it might be more effective not to
assume an attack model at all, but rather to take the anomaly-based approach.
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Appendix A
Description of the Source Code
As part of the contributions of this thesis, a comprehensive Python library was developed
for constructing and evaluating anomaly detection (or change detection) algorithms, called
the changedetect library. This appendix guides the reader through the practical usage of
the library. The complete source code is also included in Appendix B.
A.1 Constructing Detection Algorithms
The library is centred around the components discussed in Chapter 4. Each component is
constructed as a Python object. The objects are described below, and demonstrated by way
of example in the construction of Scherrer et al.’s [7] detection algorithm.
Sequences. A sequence (or series) is simply implemented as a numpy array. In the
examples below, a given sequence is denoted by seq.
Windows. Sliding windows are implemented as iterators1that take a sequence as input
and yield the sub-sequences observed within successive positions of the window. Window
objects are adjustable in terms of their starting position, window length, and shift length
(and could easily be extended to include window weights). A sliding window iterator is
constructed by writing window_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(win_start, win_len, win_shift)
1An iterator is an object that performs operations on a list and returns results one at a time (called yielding
the results), rather than processing the entire list in one go. This iterative method of evaluation is also referred
to as lazy evaluation.
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Thereafter, successive sub-sequences observed within a windowed sequence are processed
using a simple loop:
for window in window_iter(seq):
do_something(window.seq)
Representations. Sub-sequences returned from window iterators are then processed by
representation objects to return new sequences. The following representations have been
implemented:
• Temporal, which simply returns the original sequence.
• Gamma and alpha-stable probability distributions, which fit the respective probability
distribution to the original sequence (using maximum likelihood estimation) and
return the fitted parameters.
• Multi-Aggregated Temporal and Multi-Aggregated Gamma, which employ temporal
and gamma representations at multiple aggregation levels.
For example, a multi-aggregated gamma representation of a given sequence may be initial-
ized by multi_gamma = MultiScaleGamma(agg_factor, agg_times), where the parameters, aggre-
gation factor and aggregation times, are described in Section 6.3.1. Thereafter, the newly
represented sequence is computed by new_seq = multi_gamma(seq).
Deviations. Deviation objects take two sequences in appropriately chosen representa-
tions and return a measure of dissimilarity between them. The follow deviations have been
implemented:
• L2 Distance, which requires that the two inputs have the same number of rows and
columns, treats each column of an array as a vector, and computes the distance
between corresponding vectors.
• Log Likelihood, which requires a probability distribution to be specified, and takes
fitted parameters of that distribution as input and computes the log likelihood function
of a given sequence.
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For example, the L2 distance object is first initialized by l2_dev = L2Distance(). Thereafter,
the deviation is computed between two sequences by dev = l2_dev(seq1, seq2).
Detectors. All of the above components are interfaced via detector objects. One class
of detectors is implemented, called local anomaly detectors. Localy anomaly detectors
construct two contiguous and synchronous windows (called the reference and test windows)
and compute a deviation between appropriately chosen representations of corresponding
reference and test sub-sequences. Using the above building blocks, anomaly detection algo-
rithms can easily be constructed. For example, Scherrer et al.’s algorithm [7] is constructed
by the following code:
detector = LocalDetector(
ref_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(ref_start, ref_len, win_shift),
test_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(test_start, test_len, win_shift),
ref_rep = MultiScaleGamma(agg_factor, agg_times),
test_rep = MultiScaleGamma(agg_factor, agg_times),
dev = L2Distance()
)
Once constructed, the detector object can process a given sequence, returning a sequence of
deviation score values associated with distinct points in time: scores = detect(seq, detector).
The next section describes how the library evaluates the resulting deviation score sequence.
A.2 Evaluating Detection Algorithms
The output of a local anomaly detection algorithm is a sequence of deviation scores, indi-
cating the likelihood of the breakdown of local stationarity at distinct points in time. Peaks
in the deviation scores are therefore identified as potential changepoints; i.e., points in the
original time series that may correspond to the start or end of an attack. A list of peaks in the
score sequence is obtained by predictions = detect_peaks(scores). Each peak in the returned
list is then regarded as a prediction of the actual changepoints.
In order to evaluate a detection algorithm, it is required to compare the predicted
changepoints to the actual changepoints. Thus, it is required to have a labelled time series;
i.e., a time series with known attack start and end times. This is achieved by the func-
tion changepoints, superposed_ts = generate_superposed(benign_ts, attack_ts, attack_start).
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The function returns two variables: the known changepoints (the attack start time and the
attack end time), and the superposed time series. The detection algorithm may then be eval-
uated by running the algorithm on the superposed time series, and comparing the predicted
changepoints with the actual changepoints. To that end, all predicted changepoints falling
within an interval of predefined length surrounding the actual changepoints are labelled as
true positives, otherwise, they are labelled as false positives. The predicted changepoints are
labelled by the function labels = label_peaks(predictions, changepoints, interval_length).
Finally, the collection of predictions and their labels is stored for later analysis.
The evaluation of each detector on each superposed time series is considered a single
experiment, thus stored in a single row of a Pandas dataframe.2 The dataframe allows for
easier analysis of the numerical results as described in the next section.
A.3 Analysing the Results
From each collection of labelled predictions corresponding to distinct experiments, the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, and the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC)
are computed and stored in the rows of a new dataframe, denoted by df. The following code
demonstrates the power of storing the results in a dataframe:





First, two detectors are selected (named single_gamma_l20 and single_gamma_l22) then the true
positive rate for a fixed probability of false alarm of 10−4 (named tpr_pfa_0_0001) is plotted
on the y-axis versus the attack time series on the x-axis. Different detectors are coloured in
different hues, thus producing the plot in Fig. A.1.
The powerful combination of the Seaborn library together with Pandas dataframes is
further demonstrated by a final example. ROC curves for all experiments are plotted using
only three lines of code:
2A dataframe is a data structure for working with tabular data that require named, two-dimensional
indexing.
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Fig. A.1. An example plot generated by source code in the text. The plot serves to demonstrate the
output of the code (without any further refinements as in the rest of the thesis) and is not intended to




The Seaborn package combined with the Pandas dataframe allows to create a grid of plots
with rows corresponding to benign time series, columns corresponding to attack time series,
and hues (or the colours of the line plots) corresponding to detectors. The false positive
rate (or probability of false alarm) and true positive rate (or probability of detection) are
‘mapped’ to the plot_roc function, which plots the ROC curves in each cell of the grid. Since
there were a total of nine attack time series and fourteen benign time series, the resulting
number of ROC curves is difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, the ROC curves for the above
code block are included in Fig. A.2 on the next page.
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This thesis strives to be completely open and reproducible. The author’s intention is for
this thesis to serve as part of a foundation for new researchers to more easily enter the
domain and provide their own original research. To that end, the developed computer code
is included in its entirety in this appendix, in addition to the guided description through the
code in Appendix A.
B.1 Dependencies
The code used in this thesis was written in Python version 3.6.3 within the Anaconda envi-
ronment version 4.4.10 (64 bit). In addition to the standard Python libraries, the following
external libraries were used:
• Numpy version 1.13.3: A library for standard scientific computation tools, e.g., data
structures implementing vectors and matrices, vector computations, and so on.
• Scipy version 1.0.0: Statistical methods, including probability density functions and
parameter fitting mechanisms for standard probability distributions.
• Pylevy version 0.6: A library for evaluating and fitting the alpha-stable distribution.
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• Pandas version 0.22.0: A library for manipulating, cleaning, exploring, and analysing
medium-sized tabular datasets, which was used to analyse the results of the numerical
experiments.
• Scikit-learn version 0.19.1: A library for implementing machine learning algorithms,
though its use here has been limited to implementing classification accuracy metrics.
• Jupyter version 1.0.0: Most of the descriptive and graphical analyses here, including
the generated figures, were developed in Jupyter notebooks.
• Matplotlib version 2.1.1: A low-level plotting library for visualising data.
• Seaborn version 0.8.1: A wrapper around Matplotlib for enhanced visualisation.
• Dpkt version 1.9.1: A library for reading and parsing network traffic data in the form of
pcap files, used to extract time series data.
B.2 Source Code Contents
Each separate file of the code is included as a distinct Source Code block hereafter:
Source Code B.1. changedetect/sequence.py
"""
A sequence is just a 1D array or a vector. A multivariate sequence is just a 2D
array or a matrix. Each column of the matrix corresponds to a distinct
variable. Each row of the matrix corresponds to a point in time (or space).
seq.shape[0] : number of rows == number of sample points.
seq.shape[1] : number of cols == number of variables.
len(seq) == seq.shape[0] is _possibly_ a more interpretable form for the number
of sample points.
"""
from numpy import ndarray as Sequence
Source Code B.2. changedetect/window.py
"""
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from typing import Iterator, NamedTuple
from changedetect.sequence import Sequence
Window = NamedTuple("Window", [("start", int), ("end", int), ("seq", Sequence)])
class WindowIterator:




def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Iterator[Window]:
raise NotImplementedError
class SlidingWindowIterator(WindowIterator):
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Iterator[Window]:
first_end = self.start + self.length
last_end = len(seq) + 1
ends = range(first_end, last_end, self.shift)
for end in ends:
start = end - self.length
subseq = seq[start:end]
yield Window(start, end, subseq)
Source Code B.3. changedetect/representation.py
"""
We try to represent sequences by compressed alternatives, e.g., parameters of
some model.
"""
import numpy as np
from scipy.stats import gamma
from pylevy.levy import fit_levy
from changedetect.sequence import Sequence
from changedetect.tools import multiagg
class Representation:
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
raise NotImplementedError
class Temporal(Representation):
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
return seq
class Gamma(Representation):
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
return np.array(gamma.fit(seq, floc=0))
class Levy(Representation):
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
return np.array(fit_levy(seq))
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class MultiScaleTemporal(Representation):
def __init__(self, factor: int, times: int) -> None:
self.factor = factor
self.times = times
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
return np.array([x for x in multiagg(seq, self.factor, self.times)])
class MultiScaleGamma(Representation):
def __init__(self, factor: int, times: int) -> None:
self.factor = factor
self.times = times
def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
return np.array([gamma.fit(x, floc=0)
for x in multiagg(seq, self.factor, self.times)])
Source Code B.4. changedetect/deviation.py
"""
A deviation can be calculated between two sequences or representations of them.
The same type of representation must be used on each sequence.
"""
import numpy as np
from scipy.spatial.distance import euclidean
from scipy.stats import rv_continuous as Distribution
from changedetect.sequence import Sequence
from pylevy.levy import neglog_levy
class Deviation:
def __call__(self, seq1: Sequence, seq2: Sequence) -> Sequence:
raise NotImplementedError
class L2Distance(Deviation):
def __call__(self, seq1: Sequence, seq2: Sequence) -> Sequence:
if seq1.shape != seq2.shape:
raise ValueError("seq1␣and␣seq2␣must␣have␣the␣same␣shape.")
return np.array([euclidean(col1, col2)
for col1, col2 in zip(seq1.T, seq2.T)])
class LogLikelihood(Deviation):
def __init__(self, dist: Distribution) -> None:
self.dist = dist
def __call__(self, params: Sequence, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
shape, loc, scale = params




def __call__(self, params: Sequence, seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
print(params.shape, params)
alpha, beta, mu, sigma, _ = params
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"""Combiner is a function that takes a 1D array of deviations (likelihoods)
and somehow combines them, e.g., maximum, product, sum, average."""
def __init__(self, dist: Distribution, combiner) -> None:
self.dist = dist
self.combiner = combiner
def __call__(self, multi_params: Sequence, multi_seq: Sequence) -> Sequence:
deviations = []
for params, seq in zip(multi_params, multi_seq): # for each time scale
shape, loc, scale = params
logpdf = self.dist.logpdf(seq, shape, loc=loc, scale=scale)
deviations.append(np.abs(logpdf.sum()))
return self.combiner(deviations)
Source Code B.5. changedetect/detector.py
"""
Detectors are combinations of Window, Representation, Deviation, and Threshold.
A detector really is just a collection of these sub-objects.
The detector object says how we link together the sub-objects to perform









import numpy as np
from typing import Iterator, NamedTuple
from changedetect.sequence import Sequence
from changedetect.window import WindowIterator
from changedetect.representation import Representation
from changedetect.deviation import Deviation
Score = NamedTuple("Score", [("time", int), ("value", float)])
ScoreSequence = NamedTuple("ScoreSeq", [("times", Sequence), ("vals", Sequence)])
class Detector:
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test_rep: Representation,






def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Iterator[Score]:
for ref, test in zip(self.ref_iter(seq), self.test_iter(seq)):
ref_rep = self.ref_rep(ref.seq)
test_rep = self.test_rep(test.seq)





















def __call__(self, seq: Sequence) -> Iterator[Score]:
for ref_H0, test in zip(self.ref_iter(seq), self.test_iter(seq)):




win_dev_H0 = self.dev(ref_H0_rep, test_rep)
win_dev_H1 = self.dev(ref_H1_rep, test_rep)
win_dev = self.combiner(win_dev_H0, win_dev_H1)
yield Score(test.start, win_dev)
def sample_attack_ts(self) -> Sequence:
until = self.attack_ts_len - self.ref_len
subset_start = np.random.randint(until)
subset_end = subset_start + self.ref_len
return self.attack_ts[subset_start:subset_end]
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Source Code B.6. changedetect/evaluator.py
"""
First we need a labelled sequence generator.
Example 1. A basic Gaussian with mean-change simulator might take in the
parameters: mean, variance, changepoint, mean-change magnitude, and output
a tuple (sequence, changepoint).
Example 2. A superposition approach will take as input: benign sequence,
attack sequence, attack shift, and output a tuple (superposed sequence, attack
shift).
Then we need an evaluator, which will take as input: labelled sequence,
detector, and output the performance analysis/results.
Performance results, will include: the ROC curve and AUC.
"""
from typing import Dict, List, NamedTuple, Tuple
import numpy as np
from changedetect.sequence import Sequence
from changedetect.detector import Detector
from changedetect.detect_peaks import detect_peaks




ScoreSequence = NamedTuple("ScoreSeq", [("times", Sequence), ("vals", Sequence)])
PeakSequence = NamedTuple(’Peak’, [(’times’, np.ndarray), (’vals’, np.ndarray)])
def shift_array(arr, shift):
result = np.empty_like(arr)
if shift > 0:
result[:shift] = 0
result[shift:] = arr[:-shift]








attack_start: int) -> LabelledSeq:
attack_len = len(attack_ts)
pad_len = len(benign_ts) - attack_len
attack_ts_padded = np.pad(attack_ts, (0, pad_len), ’constant’)
attack_ts_shifted = shift_array(attack_ts_padded, attack_start)
superposed_ts = benign_ts + attack_ts_shifted
changepoints = np.array([attack_start, attack_start + attack_len])
return LabelledSeq(changepoints, superposed_ts)
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def detect(seq: Sequence, detector: Detector) -> ScoreSequence:
times_vals = [time_val for time_val in detector(seq)]




def separate_scores(scores: Dict) -> Dict:
"""Some detectors output multiple deviation scores. These should be treated
as distinct detectors. Thus, we separate them here."""
result = {}
for name, (score_times, score_vals) in scores.items():
if score_vals.ndim == 1:
score_vals = score_vals.reshape((-1, 1))
num_cols = score_vals.shape[1]
for i, separate_score_vals in enumerate(score_vals.T):
if num_cols == 1:
key = name
else:
key = name + str(i)
result[key] = ScoreSequence(score_times, separate_score_vals)
return result
def multiple_detect(seq: Sequence, detectors: Dict):
"""Sometimes we want to perform detection on the same sequence with multiple
detectors. This function does so, and separates multiple deviation scores
from within the same detector if necessary."""
combined_scores = {name: detect(seq, detector)
for name, detector in detectors.items()}
return separate_scores(combined_scores)
def _detect_peaks(score: ScoreSequence) -> PeakSequence:
"""Find the peak times and values in a score sequence."""




def multiple_detect_peaks(scores: Dict) -> Dict:
"""From a dictionary of scores corresponding to multiple detectors,
find the peak times and values for each detector score."""
return {name: _detect_peaks(score) for name, score in scores.items()}
def label_peaks(peaks: PeakSequence,
changepoints: np.ndarray,
threshold: int) -> np.ndarray:
"""Label a list of peaks as 1 if they are sufficiently close to a
changepoint or 0 otherwise."""
peak_labels = np.zeros_like(peaks.times)
for cp in changepoints:
peak_labels |= (np.abs(peaks.times - cp) < threshold)
return peak_labels
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def multiple_label_peaks(peaks: PeakSequence, changepoints, threshold):
"""Label the peaks from a dictionary of scores corresponding to multiple
detectors."""
return {name: label_peaks(peak, changepoints, threshold)
for name, peak in peaks.items()}
Source Code B.7. changedetect/tools.py
"""
Collection of tools for manipulating sequences.
"""
from typing import Any, Callable, Iterator, List
from itertools import accumulate, islice, repeat
from functools import partial
import numpy as np
from changedetect.sequence import Sequence
def pad(seq: Sequence, factor: int) -> Sequence:
"""
Pad a sequence with zeroes until the length of the padded sequence is
divisible by a given factor.
"""
overflow_len = len(seq) % factor
if overflow_len:
pad_len = factor - overflow_len
seq = np.pad(seq, (0, pad_len), ’constant’)
return seq
def clip(seq: Sequence, factor: int) -> Sequence:
"""
Clips a sequence until its length is divisible by a given factor.
"""




def aggregate(seq: Sequence, factor: int) -> Sequence:
"""
Split a sequence into sub-sequences of length factor, take the average of
each sub-sequence, return the resulting ’aggregated’ sequence.
"""
if factor > len(seq):
raise StopIteration
result = clip(seq, factor)
result = result.reshape(-1, factor)
result = np.mean(result, axis=1)
return result
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def iterate(f: Callable, x: Any) -> Iterator:
return accumulate(repeat(x), lambda fx, _: f(fx))
def multiagg(seq: Sequence, factor: int, times: int) -> Iterator[Sequence]:
aggregate_factor = partial(aggregate, factor=factor)
aggregate_iter = iterate(aggregate_factor, seq)
result = islice(aggregate_iter, times)
return result
Source Code B.8. changedetect/detect_peaks.py [44]
# %load ./../functions/detect_peaks.py
"""Detect peaks in data based on their amplitude and other features."""
from __future__ import division, print_function




def detect_peaks(x, mph=None, mpd=1, threshold=0, edge=’rising’,
kpsh=False, valley=False, show=False, ax=None):
"""Detect peaks in data based on their amplitude and other features.
Parameters
----------
x : 1D array_like
data.
mph : {None, number}, optional (default = None)
detect peaks that are greater than minimum peak height.
mpd : positive integer, optional (default = 1)
detect peaks that are at least separated by minimum peak distance (in
number of data).
threshold : positive number, optional (default = 0)
detect peaks (valleys) that are greater (smaller) than ‘threshold‘
in relation to their immediate neighbors.
edge : {None, ’rising’, ’falling’, ’both’}, optional (default = ’rising’)
for a flat peak, keep only the rising edge (’rising’), only the
falling edge (’falling’), both edges (’both’), or don’t detect a
flat peak (None).
kpsh : bool, optional (default = False)
keep peaks with same height even if they are closer than ‘mpd‘.
valley : bool, optional (default = False)
if True (1), detect valleys (local minima) instead of peaks.
show : bool, optional (default = False)
if True (1), plot data in matplotlib figure.
ax : a matplotlib.axes.Axes instance, optional (default = None).
Returns
-------
ind : 1D array_like
indeces of the peaks in ‘x‘.
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Notes
-----
The detection of valleys instead of peaks is performed internally by simply
negating the data: ‘ind_valleys = detect_peaks(-x)‘
The function can handle NaN’s
See this IPython Notebook [1]_.
References
----------




>>> from detect_peaks import detect_peaks
>>> x = np.random.randn(100)
>>> x[60:81] = np.nan
>>> # detect all peaks and plot data
>>> ind = detect_peaks(x, show=True)
>>> print(ind)
>>> x = np.sin(2*np.pi*5*np.linspace(0, 1, 200)) + np.random.randn(200)/5
>>> # set minimum peak height = 0 and minimum peak distance = 20
>>> detect_peaks(x, mph=0, mpd=20, show=True)
>>> x = [0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 3, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0]
>>> # set minimum peak distance = 2
>>> detect_peaks(x, mpd=2, show=True)
>>> x = np.sin(2*np.pi*5*np.linspace(0, 1, 200)) + np.random.randn(200)/5
>>> # detection of valleys instead of peaks
>>> detect_peaks(x, mph=0, mpd=20, valley=True, show=True)
>>> x = [0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0]
>>> # detect both edges
>>> detect_peaks(x, edge=’both’, show=True)
>>> x = [-2, 1, -2, 2, 1, 1, 3, 0]
>>> # set threshold = 2
>>> detect_peaks(x, threshold = 2, show=True)
"""
x = np.atleast_1d(x).astype(’float64’)




# find indices of all peaks






ine, ire, ife = np.array([[], [], []], dtype=int)
if not edge:
ine = np.where((np.hstack((dx, 0)) < 0) & (np.hstack((0, dx)) > 0))[0]
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else:
if edge.lower() in [’rising’, ’both’]:
ire = np.where((np.hstack((dx, 0)) <= 0) &
(np.hstack((0, dx)) > 0))[0]
if edge.lower() in [’falling’, ’both’]:
ife = np.where((np.hstack((dx, 0)) < 0) &
(np.hstack((0, dx)) >= 0))[0]
ind = np.unique(np.hstack((ine, ire, ife)))
# handle NaN’s
if ind.size and indnan.size:
# NaN’s and values close to NaN’s cannot be peaks
ind = ind[np.in1d(ind, np.unique(np.hstack(
(indnan, indnan-1, indnan+1))), invert=True)]
# first and last values of x cannot be peaks
if ind.size and ind[0] == 0:
ind = ind[1:]
if ind.size and ind[-1] == x.size-1:
ind = ind[:-1]
# remove peaks < minimum peak height
if ind.size and mph is not None:
ind = ind[x[ind] >= mph]
# remove peaks - neighbors < threshold
if ind.size and threshold > 0:
dx = np.min(np.vstack([x[ind]-x[ind-1], x[ind]-x[ind+1]]), axis=0)
ind = np.delete(ind, np.where(dx < threshold)[0])
# detect small peaks closer than minimum peak distance
if ind.size and mpd > 1:
ind = ind[np.argsort(x[ind])][::-1] # sort ind by peak height
idel = np.zeros(ind.size, dtype=bool)
for i in range(ind.size):
if not idel[i]:
# keep peaks with the same height if kpsh is True
idel = idel | (ind >= ind[i] - mpd) & (ind <= ind[i] + mpd) \
& (x[ind[i]] > x[ind] if kpsh else True)
idel[i] = 0 # Keep current peak







_plot(x, mph, mpd, threshold, edge, valley, ax, ind)
return ind
def _plot(x, mph, mpd, threshold, edge, valley, ax, ind):
"""Plot results of the detect_peaks function, see its help."""
try:




if ax is None:
_, ax = plt.subplots(1, 1, figsize=(8, 4))
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ax.plot(x, ’b’, lw=1)
if ind.size:
label = ’valley’ if valley else ’peak’
label = label + ’s’ if ind.size > 1 else label
ax.plot(ind, x[ind], ’+’, mfc=None, mec=’r’, mew=2, ms=8,
label=’%d␣%s’ % (ind.size, label))
ax.legend(loc=’best’, framealpha=.5, numpoints=1)
ax.set_xlim(-.02*x.size, x.size*1.02-1)
ymin, ymax = x[np.isfinite(x)].min(), x[np.isfinite(x)].max()
yrange = ymax - ymin if ymax > ymin else 1
ax.set_ylim(ymin - 0.1*yrange, ymax + 0.1*yrange)
ax.set_xlabel(’Data␣#’, fontsize=14)
ax.set_ylabel(’Amplitude’, fontsize=14)
mode = ’Valley␣detection’ if valley else ’Peak␣detection’
ax.set_title("%s␣(mph=%s,␣mpd=%d,␣threshold=%s,␣edge=’%s’)"
% (mode, str(mph), mpd, str(threshold), edge))
# plt.grid()
plt.show()
Source Code B.9. run_experiments.py
"""
Run the experiments for each unexplored algorithm and pickle the results.
v4: * Fixed multi_gamma_likelihood()
v3: * Refactored the script to make it a bit more reuseable.
v2: * Changed from np.genfromtxt() to np.load(), had to convert csvs to npys.
Can expect ~500 times speedup in loading parts.
* Added an if statement to check for cases where not a single changepoint
is correctly found. If so, fpr tpr threshold auc are all set to NaN.
"""
import os
from time import time
from glob import glob
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
from scipy import stats
from changedetect.window import SlidingWindowIterator











from changedetect.detector import LocalDetector









global ref_len, test_len, win_shift, agg_factor, agg_times, cp_interval, \
benign_filepaths, attack_filepaths, freq, num_attack_starts
detector_name = ’single_gamma_l2’





ref_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(0, ref_len, win_shift),





detector_dict = {detector_name: detector}
run_experiments(detector_name, detector_dict, detector_params)
def run_single_gamma_likelihood():
global ref_len, test_len, win_shift, agg_factor, agg_times, cp_interval, \
benign_filepaths, attack_filepaths, freq, num_attack_starts
detector_name = ’single_gamma_likelihood’





ref_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(0, ref_len, win_shift),





detector_dict = {detector_name: detector}
run_experiments(detector_name, detector_dict, detector_params)
def run_multi_gamma_l2():
global ref_len, test_len, win_shift, agg_factor, agg_times, cp_interval, \
benign_filepaths, attack_filepaths, freq, num_attack_starts
detector_name = ’multi_gamma_l2’









ref_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(0, ref_len, win_shift),
test_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(ref_len, test_len, win_shift),
ref_rep = MultiScaleGamma(agg_factor, agg_times),
test_rep = MultiScaleGamma(agg_factor, agg_times),
dev = L2Distance()
)
detector_dict = {detector_name: detector}
run_experiments(detector_name, detector_dict, detector_params)
def run_multi_gamma_likelihood():
global ref_len, test_len, win_shift, agg_factor, agg_times, cp_interval, \
benign_filepaths, attack_filepaths, freq, num_attack_starts
detector_name = ’multi_gamma_likelihood’







ref_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(0, ref_len, win_shift),
test_iter = SlidingWindowIterator(ref_len, test_len, win_shift),
ref_rep = MultiScaleGamma(agg_factor, agg_times),
test_rep = MultiScaleTemporal(agg_factor, agg_times),
dev = MultiScaleLogLikelihood(stats.gamma, np.sum)
)
detector_dict = {detector_name: detector}
run_experiments(detector_name, detector_dict, detector_params)
# Run experiments
# TODO: There’s definitely a better way to structure this. The detector object
# should carry information like its name and params.
def run_experiments(detector_name, detectors, detector_params):






















for i, benign_filepath in enumerate(benign_filepaths):
# Load benign time series
benign_ts = np.load(benign_filepath)
benign_name = os.path.basename(benign_filepath).split(’.’)[0]
for j, attack_filepath in enumerate(attack_filepaths):
# Load attack time series
attack_ts = np.load(attack_filepath)
# Take first 100 seconds of attack as in Booters paper.
attack_ts = attack_ts[:100 * freq]
attack_name = os.path.basename(attack_filepath).split(’.’)[0]
# Calculate evenly spaced attack start times
attack_starts = (np.linspace(ref_len + test_len,
(len(benign_ts) - len(attack_ts)
- ref_len - test_len),
num_attack_starts)
.astype(int))
for k, attack_start in enumerate(attack_starts):
# Generate labelled time series
changepoints, superposed_ts = generate_superposed(
benign_ts, attack_ts, attack_start)
# Run detectors
scores = multiple_detect(superposed_ts, detectors)
# Detect peaks in scores
peaks = multiple_detect_peaks(scores)
# Label peaks
labels = multiple_label_peaks(peaks, changepoints, cp_interval)
# Append to the data array
for name in scores:
score_times, score_vals = scores[name]



























df.to_pickle(’output\\’ + detector_name + ’.pkl’)
duration = time() - start_time
print(f’Finished:␣{duration}’)
if __name__ == ’__main__’:







ref_len = 60 * freq # = 1 min. Scherrer et al. use 1 min and 10 min.
test_len = 10 * freq # = 10 sec. Scherrer et al. use 1 min.
win_shift = 10 * freq # = 10 sec. Scherrer et al. use 1 min.
# Multi-aggregation
agg_factor = 2 # Scherrer et al. & Dewaele et al. use 2.
agg_times = 7 # Scherrer et al. use 10, Dewaele et al. use 7.




run_multi_gamma_l2() # Scherrer et al.’s detector
run_multi_gamma_likelihood()
Source Code B.10. compute_roc.py
"""
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Compute ROC curves from the experimental results data.
"""
import numpy as np
import pandas as pd
from sklearn import metrics
from sys import argv
def compute_roc_df(filepath):
"""Compute the ROC curves for each (detector, benign_ts, attack_ts)
combination in a dataframe, and write the results to a new dataframe."""
df = pd.read_pickle(filepath)
grouped = df.groupby([’benign_name’, ’attack_name’, ’detector_name’])
columns = [’benign_name’, ’attack_name’, ’detector_name’, ’peak_vals’,
’peak_labels’, ’fpr’, ’tpr’, ’thresholds’, ’auc’]
data = []
for name, group in grouped:
peak_vals = np.concatenate([x for x in group.peak_vals])
peak_labels = np.concatenate([x for x in group.peak_labels])
if 1 not in peak_labels:
fpr, tpr, thresholds = np.nan, np.nan, np.nan
auc = np.nan
else:
fpr, tpr, thresholds = metrics.roc_curve(peak_labels, peak_vals,
drop_intermediate=True)
auc = metrics.auc(fpr, tpr)
data.append(list(name) + [peak_vals, peak_labels, fpr, tpr, thresholds,
auc])
rocdf = pd.DataFrame(data=data, columns=columns)
rocdf.to_pickle(filepath[:-4] + ’_roc.pkl’)
if __name__ == ’__main__’:




Source Code B.11. extract_timeseries.py
"""
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from datetime import datetime




"""Extracts time series of packet counts from pcap file.
Had to resort to datetime module due to an accumulation of floating
point errors each time the next window_end time was calculated, if
we worked directly on the packet_timestamp floats.
Args:
packets_pcap_filename (string): Path to a packet trace pcap file.
timeseries_csv_filename (string): Path to the output time series csv file.
interval_length (int): Sample interval length in milliseconds.
"""
timer = time.time()
with open(packets_pcap_filename, ’rb’) as packets_pcap_file, \
open(timeseries_csv_filename, ’w’) as timeseries_csv_file:
packets_pcap_reader = dpkt.pcap.Reader(packets_pcap_file)
# Convert interval_length to timedelta
interval_length = timedelta(milliseconds=interval_length)
# Read first packet for starting time, convert to datetime
start_time, _ = next(packets_pcap_reader)
start_time = datetime.utcfromtimestamp(start_time)
# First window starts at first timestamp
window_end = start_time + interval_length
count = 1 # Count starts at 1 since we’ve already read a packet
# Loop through remaining packets to construct time series
for packet_timestamp, _ in packets_pcap_reader:
packet_timestamp = datetime.utcfromtimestamp(packet_timestamp)
if packet_timestamp < window_end:
# Packet is in the current window, increase current window count
count += 1
else:
# First packet of the next window, write current window count
# to file.
timeseries_csv_file.write("{}\n".format(count))




# Want to also write some metadata to file:
# Start date and time (nice format)
# End date and time (nice format)
# Interval length (ms)
# Number of windows
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if __name__ == "__main__":
PATH = ’C:\\WAIKATO_TRACES\\pcap\\*.pcap’
for pcapname in glob.glob(PATH):
csvname = pcapname[:-4] + ’csv’
print(f’Extracting␣time␣series␣from␣{pcapname}␣to␣{csvname}’)
extract_timeseries(pcapname, csvname, 1)
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